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INHO CHOI*

Global Climate Change and the Use of
Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design
Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading with an Analysis of
the European Union's CO 2 Emissions
Trading Directive and the Climate
Stewardship Act
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses the ideal design features of a domestic
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading program that are
critical to the cost-effective implementation offuture U.S. climate
change policy. The discussion of a properly designed domestic
GHG trading program is coupled with an analysis of both the
European Union's Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions Trading
Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003, proposed by
Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman.
The Article begins with the argument that climate change
policy does not necessarily entail huge compliance costs. Rather,
implementation of well-designed domestic climate change policy
will have the effect of aligning energy development and
environmental protection goals while minimizing its short-term
economic impacts. By encouraging reduced fossil fuel usage,
climate change policy has the potential to integratesustainability
concerns into all levels of economic decision making, thereby
producing ancillary societal benefits such as improvements in
existing air quality and public health.
In light of the large number of pollution sources and the
relative ease in measuring C0 2 emissions, this Article argues that
emissions trading or a carbon tax system should be an essential
part of any successful climate stabilization strategy. However, it
S.J.D. (2006), LL.M. (2002), The George Washington University Law School; LL.M.
(1998), LL.B. (1993), Chungnam National University College of Law, South Korea. Please
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is unlikely that a carbon tax will be politically acceptable in the
United States despite the tax's theoretical appeal. Based on prior
experiments with emissions trading programs in the United
States, the Article discusses the ideal design features of domestic
GHG emissions trading. These features include early reduction
credits, banking and borrowing, opt-in, offset trading,
international emissions trading, and effective monitoring and
verification. During the course of discussion, the Article
examines the program elements of the European Union's C02
Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act.
Lastly, this Article briefly introduces several studies that
have estimated the economic effects of the Climate Stewardship
Act. The Article concludes that domestic climate change policy
can be implemented in a cost-effective manner and stresses the
need for the United States to take domestic action on climate
change.
INTRODUCTION
We cannot live without utilizing energy; easy access to
inexpensive and abundant fossil-fuel-based energy is the foundation of
today's globalized economy. However, the mobility, convenience, and
Western life style made possible by the excessive use of fossil fuels do
not come without a price. From exploration and development to
transportation and end-use, the production and consumption of fossil
fuels result in ecosystem destruction and species extinction, massivescale air pollution and related public health costs, global warming,
unstable energy prices, and huge national defense expenditures.
Most importantly, the phenomenon of global climate change
caused by the ever-increasing atmospheric build-up of carbon dioxide
(C0 2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted by various human
sources is a resounding warning signal that our fossil-fuel-based
civilization may not be sustainable in the long term. Indeed, future
generations may end up paying unjustifiably high costs ascribed to past
and present mismanagement of fossil fuel consumption patterns.
Given this scenario, it is not surprising that sustainable use of
fossil-fuel-based energy has become the overriding concern in the
formulation and implementation of energy policy worldwide. However,
the economic system of the United States is skewed toward promoting
use of nonrenewable carbon-based resources. Despite several decades of
national efforts to promote clean and efficient energy technologies, the
American energy structure is still characterized by coal dominance in
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electricity generation and the heavy consumption of foreign petroleum
2
in the transportation sector.
This reliance on fossil fuel is largely due to the failure of
domestic environmental and energy law and policy to adequately
balance energy development goals with the goals of environmental
protection. To put it in economic terms, the failure of the current legal
system to promote clean energy development has sent wrong price
signals to producers and consumers that do not adequately reflect
environmental externalities. The inefficiency of the U.S. energy structure
explains the strong opposition by the U.S. government to the Kyoto
Protocol on Climate Change;3 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol

1. Electric utilities are the number one source of C02 emissions in the United States.
This sector was responsible for approximately 40 percent of national CO2 emissions in 2001.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (EPA), EPA-430-R-03-004, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2001, ES-15 (2003) [hereinafter U.S. GHG EMISSIONS AND SINKS
FOR 1999-20011. In 1998, electric utilities were responsible for 25 percent of national
nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions, 67 percent of sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions, and eight
percent of emissions of particulate matter that is equal to, or bigger than, ten microns in
diameter (PMlo), respectively. U.S. EPA, EPA-454-R-00-002, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT
EMISSION TRENDS: 1900-1998, 2-2, 2-3 (2000) [hereinafter NATIONAL AIR EMISSION TRENDS
FOR 1900-19981. In 2002, coal was used to generate 50 percent of total electricity net
generation in the United States. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0384, ANNUAL ENERGY
REVIEW, 2004 tbl. 8.2a., at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf [hereinafter
Annual Energy Review]. Coal combustion produced approximately 85 percent of C02
emissions from fossil-fuel-fired electric generation because of the high carbon content of
coal compared to other fossil fuels. U.S. GHG EMISSIONS AND SINKS FOR 1999-2001, supra, at
2-4, tbl. 2-3, ES-14. More than 90 percent of electric utility NOx and SO2 emissions came
from coal-fired power plants. NATIONAL AIR EMISSION TRENDS FOR 1900-1998, supra, at 2-2.
2. U.S. dependence on foreign oil supplies has deepened since the 1970s. U.S. net
petroleum imports increased from about six million barrels per day in 1973 to 11.24 million
barrels per day in 2003. This constituted about half of the nation's total petroleum
consumption, 19.7 million barrels per day in that year. Annual Energy Review, supra note
1, tbl. 5.1. Stability in oil prices since the late 1970s is the most significant factor
contributing to increased petroleum consumption. When valued in real dollars, crude oil
refinery acquisition costs peaked at $56.5 per barrel in 1981, dropped to $19.32 in 1986, and
then stabilized at around $20 until 2002. See id. tbl. 5.19. The transportation sector emitted
nearly 31 percent of U.S. GHG emissions in 2001. U.S. GHG EMISSIONS AND SINKS FOR 19992001, supra note 1, at ES-7, tbl. ES-3. Although vehicle fuel efficiency and emission controls
have improved significantly since the Clean Air Act (CAA) was enacted in 1970, the
increase in both vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and the size of the vehicle fleet has offset
most of the air quality benefits derived from the use of more energy-efficient vehicles. See
ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
270 (2001).

3. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998)
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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necessarily requires a reconfiguration of current U.S. energy law and
4
policy, which potentially implicates huge short-term transition costs.
As the history of the Clean Air Act's (CAA) New Source Review
(NSR) program has clearly demonstrated,5 environmental regulations
favor older, dirtier energy sources. 6 In most instances, the regulations
4. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the United States, if it ratifies the treaty, would be
obligated to reduce its 1990 level GHG emissions by seven percent during the 2008-2012
compliance period. Id. art. 3.1 & Annex B. It is generally understood that the seven-percent
reduction target is difficult to achieve under the current business-as-usual scenario. See,
e.g., U.S. EIA, DOE/EIA-0383, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2001 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2020,
at 97, fig. 124 (Dec. 22,2000); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002: THIRD
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNDER THE UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 73 (May 2002). It is important to

note that the United States is a contracting party to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992). The
UNFCCC declared as its objective the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system," and exhorted developed countries to stabilize their GHG emissions to
1990 levels. Id. arts 2, 4(2)(b). Therefore, it is fair to say that, under the present "no regrets"
approach, the United States as a party to the UNFCCC is certain to fail to meet the legal
obligation to stabilize its GHG emissions at even 1990 levels.
5. Under the CAA, major new sources, and existing stationary sources proposing a
change (physical or operational) entailing a significant increase in emissions of a criteria or
regulated air pollutant (or emissions of any such pollutant not previously emitted), must
obtain preconstruction permits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7503(a) (2000); see also id.
§ 7411(a)(2), (a)(4) (definitions of new source and modification). NSR subjects new sources
in attainment areas and nonattainment areas to rigorous air quality-related study requirements and the offset requirement, respectively. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(e), 7503(c). Upon a
finding of NSR applicability, new sources must install the best achievable control
technology (BACT) or the lowest achievable emissions rate (LAER), depending on the
area's attainment status. Id. §§ 7479(3), 7501(3). This technology requirement is quite
onerous in that sources are required to pursue the right mix of control options to minimize
air quality impacts to the maximum extent possible. See id. Note that an area can be in
attainment for one criteria pollutant and in nonattainment for another pollutant. As a
result, both technology standards could apply to the same source. In such a case, the source
applicant must prepare for both prevention of significant deterioration and nonattainment
NSR simultaneously. Contrary to initial expectations that more and more existing sources
would be brought under NSR over time, the dichotomy between new and existing sources
has allowed grandfathered sources to stay operational beyond their expected life cycle
without being subject to NSPS and NSR requirements using such loopholes as "netting"
and the "routine maintenance" exception. This is one of the factors that has played a
prominent role in perpetuating coal dominance in the electric utility industry.
6. One of the key features permeating the CAA and other environmental statutes is
that they often distinguish between new and existing sources. This is generally known as
"grandfathering." The oldest such examples are the new source performance standards
(NSPS). See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Clean Water Act). Under the
grandfathering scheme, sources that existed at the time of enactment or proposed rule
making are exempted from more stringent new pollution control requirements. The reason
for the differential treatment may be political (the great influence of industry on politics) or
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impose more stringent percentage-input based emission reduction
requirements on new sources, even though these sources are oftentimes
much cleaner than older, grandfathered sources.7 This so-called new
source bias has created perverse incentives for grandfathered sources to
escape stringent new requirements, while negatively impacting the
competitiveness of newer, cleaner fossil-fuel-burning technologies and
renewable energy technologies. 8
In the past, "cost-of-service" electricity regulation, based on
average cost pricing, discouraged capital investments in efficient use of
fossil fuels and promotion of renewable energy resources. 9 Since its
a lack of economic feasibility of requiring a reconfiguration of the whole facility for
compliance purposes. Whatever the justification, grandfathering contributes significantly
to creating an uneven playing field between new and existing sources. This is especially
true in the case of the energy sector, which is characterized by economies of scale and
natural monopolies; "grandfathering" potentially functions as a significant entry barrier to
new entrants.
7. Technology-based standards take the form of "emission rate" standards, which are
typically expressed in terms of the amount of emissions of a regulated pollutant based on
heat input, such as pounds (bs.) per million British Thermal Unit (mm Btu). More
demanding emission rates are required of clean-fuel-burning sources under the name of
"best available technology." Establishing emission reduction requirements on a percentage,
input basis penalizes new clean-fuel-burning sources in two respects. First, clean-fuelburning sources usually employ highly energy-efficient fuel combustion technologies. For
example, the maximum thermal efficiency of state-of-the-art combined-cycle, natural-gasfired plants is close to 60 percent, whereas the most energy-efficient coal-burning
technology currently in dominant use has a thermal efficiency of 33 percent at best. See
STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES: A GUIDE TO ELECTRIc MARKET REGULATION 4 (2000). Thus,
input-based emission standards disregard energy efficiency aspects, producing the
practical effect of rewarding old, energy-inefficient sources. Second, clean-fuel-burning
sources embodying energy-efficient technologies are subject to percentage reduction
requirements. Though less polluting and more energy-efficient, these sources must install
expensive modem post-combustion control equipment whose efficiency gains are
questionable in terms of effectiveness in pollution control compared to incurred investment
monies. See Byron Swift, Grandfathering,the New Source Review, and Nitrogen Oxide - Making
Sense of a Flawed System, 15 ENV'T REP. 1538, 1539 (2000) (observing that new gas-fired
plants subject to rigorous NSR control requirements would have to incur the cost of $2,500
to $10,000 per ton of NOx removed, while grandfathered, coal-fired plants could reduce
NOx emissions "at prices as low as $300 per ton").
8. Notably, electric utilities have kept their old coal-fired electric units operating
beyond normal life expectancy. Since 1980, few new coal-burning electric power plants
have been constructed, and preconstruction permits for major modifications have rarely
been issued to grandfathered coal-fired power plants. See Swift, supra note 7, at 1538.
Presumably, grandfathered coal-fired utilities have escaped NSR by making use of such
legal loopholes as netting and the routine maintenance exception, given the lack of a formal
notice requirement regarding intra-facility netting transactions and the fact that most of the
EPA or state-initiated NSR enforcement actions have targeted the industry practice using
the routine maintenance exception as an excuse for foregoing NSR.
9. Cost-of-service (or rate-of-return) regulation has a tendency to create an incentive
for making capital investments more (or less) than are necessary from an economic
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introduction in the early 1990s, 10 electricity sales competition at the
wholesale and retail levels has created an uncertain market environment
efficiency standpoint. This incentive depends on the generosity of a rate of return granted
to franchised utilities by state public utility commissions (PUCs) ("Averch-Johnson (AJ)
effect" or "reverse AJ effect"). See generally H. Averch & L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm
Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1053 (1962); Peter Navarro, The Simple
Analytics of Performance-BasedRatemaking: A Guidefor the PBR Regulator, 13 YALE J. REG. 105,
122 (1996). Also, it is highly likely to provide incentives to exaggerate operational expenses,
because incumbent utilities may be allowed to recover expenses on a dollar-for-dollar basis
unless it is clear that those expenses are beyond reasonable bounds ("X-inefficiency"). See
generally Harvey Leiberstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency", 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392
(1966). Under cost-of-service regulation, rates are set based on accounting average cost, not
on actual marginal cost. This means that utility service is priced regardless of its actual cost.
See Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning
in Regulating the Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1388 (1993). Moreover, under
the "universal service" doctrine, low-cost customers subsidize high-cost customers
(including low-income residents) - business and industrial customers versus residential
customers and urban customers versus rural customers. Especially in the electricity market,
cost per unit is different depending on time of day and season. Id. Pricing regardless of
marginal cost promotes overconsumption during peak demand and hence increases total
social cost, including adverse environmental impacts. Id. at 1388-89; Paul L. joskow &
Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. REG. 1, 13 (1986).
Relying on the "natural monopolies" rationale, state PUCs have granted a de jure
monopoly to one incumbent public utility and restricted competition because of their
concerns about "cream-skimming" by new entrants that potentially undercuts the
incumbent's competitiveness in highly lucrative segments of the relevant market
supporting the universal service goal. Thus, new and competitive electricity suppliers have
had a hard time marketing their products and services that would otherwise have
contributed to a cleaner environment and greater energy efficiency and conservation.
10. Electricity competition began at the interstate wholesale level with the enactment
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992; the Act gave the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) "wholesale wheeling" authority. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, tit.
VII, subtit. B, § 721, 106 Stat. 2915 (1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824j). Pursuant to this
authorization, the FERC issued three implementing orders. The first two orders, called the
Open Access Rule, required public utilities owning or operating transmission facilities to
unbundle their transmission service from other functions in an open, non-discriminatory
manner and created a utility-operated electronized real-time information sharing system
on the availability of transmission capacity. U.S. FERC, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities;
Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg.
21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 385); Open Access Same-Time
Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of
Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 37). The third order
enumerated minimum requirements and functions for the approval of independent system
operators (ISOs) or regional transmission organizations (RTOs) that would be formed in
order to create and maintain fully regional competitive wholesale markets. U.S. FERC,
Regional Transmission Organizations, Order 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. § 35). Shortly thereafter, some of the states with the highest electricity prices
opened their retail markets. Currently, 18 of the 24 states with electricity-restructuring
legislation or administrative orders allow, or plan to allow, all or some classes of customers
to choose retail service providers. See U.S. EIA, Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring
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that is detrimental to the development of cleaner, more efficient, but
cost-sensitive, energy technologies, while not yet delivering its promise
of maximizing economic efficiency and low electricity prices for the
benefit of the nation's economy and the public at large."
On the other hand, notwithstanding their relative success in
curbing pollution from large industrial sources, environmental
regulations have often failed to control small, diffuse pollution sources,
such as automobiles and nonpoint sources. Currently, these sources, in
the aggregate, cause more environmental harm than do conventional

Activity, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg-str/restructure.pdf (last updated Feb. 2003).
11. Electricity competition has resulted in highly volatile spot markets, as the 2001
California energy crisis demonstrated. Transmission bottlenecks in many parts of the
country create market uncertainty and spikes in retail prices during peak-demand periods.
In a highly uncertain legal environment during the transition period, public utilities located
in deregulation states are unwilling to invest in electric supply infrastructure because of
increased competitive pressure and high financial risks associated with transmission
investment decisions. See, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNcIL, RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
1998-2007, at 34 (1998) (pointing out that transmission owners may not have sufficient
incentive to make transmission capacity additions and upgrades due to uncertainty about
full cost recovery). Many utilities divested themselves of production and transmission
functions, acting solely as power marketers or electricity resellers or distributors. In this
highly uncertain market environment, capital investments in new and cleaner energy
technologies with cost disadvantages would likely be chilled. On the other hand, many
low-cost states, mostly those in the Northwest and the South, have resisted outside
attempts to open their wholesale markets. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of
Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 459-61 (2005). As of now,
there are only five "organized" markets located in the Northeast, California, and Texas: (1)
ISO New England (ISO-NE), (2) New York ISO (NYISO), (3) P-J-M (Pennsylvania,
Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, and the District of Columbia), (4) Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT), and (5) California ISO (CAISO). See OFF. OF MARKET OVERSIGHT
& INVESTIGATIONS, THE FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, STATE OF THE MARKETS REPORT

17 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/som2003.pdf. Market fragmentation, combined with transmission bottlenecks, has the adverse
effects of suppressing real competition and inhibiting the development and deployment of
renewable energy facilities. The best practical solution to this market conundrum is to
mandate the establishment of RTOs in all regions and the adoption of efficient transmission
pricing rules that can make possible viable price competition and reward investments in
transmission facilities. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., FERC Must Adopt an Efficient
Transmission System- Now, ELEC. J., Oct. 1997, at 79-85; Kevin Porter, If SMD Dies, What
Parts of Order 888 Do We Need to Fix?, ELEC. J., Dec. 2003, at 81-84. Standard market design
(SMD) rules proposed in 2002 by the FERC embodied these ideas but are now being stalled
in the face of strong opposition from many states, including California. U.S. FERC,
Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design (Docket No. RM01-12-000), 100 F.E.R.C. 61,138, 2002
FERC LEXIS 1739 (July 31, 2002); see also Lori A. Burkhart, A Fight Over Market Design, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Nov. 15, 2002, at 18-31 (compiling responses to SMD from six state PUC
chairpersons representing each of the regions with divergent interests).
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smokestack and manufacturing industries. 12 Contrary to politicians' and
policy makers' initial expectations that modem science and technology
would be capable of solving most of the persistent environmental
pollution problems without changing Western heavy-consumption
lifestyles, 13 it became apparent that pollution would continue unless the
legal system addresses its root cause head-on: wasteful use of scarce
natural resources, perpetuated by industrial society's predisposition to
reward wealth-creating economic activity without regard to its
environmental consequences.
It is clear, however, that current levels of consumption and
population growth cannot be continued indefinitely. Because the adverse
consequences of past and present mismanagement of the environment
and natural resources will be borne by future generations, it is time to
pursue sustainable development to secure a better future. The success of
our efforts to pursue sustainable development hinges on whether and
how we are able to create new political, legal, and socio-economic
structures that recognize the limits of the Earth's carrying capacity.
The issue of global climate change is highly relevant to this
endeavor because the massive fossil fuel consumption that supports the
globalized economy creates many forms of environmental degradation.
Climate change policy encouraging the efficient use of fossil fuels and
the development of alternative renewable energy resources has the
potential to help the nation and the rest of the world move in the
direction of sustainable development. Contrary to the general perception
that directly addressing climate change could potentially become the
death knell for our economic prosperity, implementation of welldesigned climate change policy may well have the effect of aligning
energy development and environmental protection goals while
12. In 1998, the transportation sector was responsible for 79 percent of carbon
monoxide (CO) emissions, 53 percent of NOx emissions, and 43 percent of emissions of
volatile organic compounds (VOCs). NATIONAL AIR EMISSION TRENDS FOR 1900-1998, supra
note 1, figs. 2-1, 2-2, 2-3. The majority of the remaining water quality problems are caused
by polluted runoff from nonpoint sources not subject to permitting requirements under the
CWA. See U.S. EPA & DEP'T OF AGRIC., EPA 840-R-98-001, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN:
RESTORING AND PROTECrING AMERICA'S WATERS 9 (1996); OFF. OF WATER, U.S. EPA, EPA
841-S-00-011, A SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: THE 1998 REPORT
TO CONGRESS 7 (2000).
13. See, e.g., 1970 CAA § 110 (setting May 31, 1975, as the initial target date for
compliance with the primary national ambient air quality standards without mentioning
legal consequences in cases of nonattainment), Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410)); 1972 CWA section 101 (a)(1)-(3) (declaring as statutory
objectives the attainment of (1) the "zero discharge" goal by 1985; (2) swimable, fishable
waters by July 1, 1983; and (3) no discharge of "toxic pollutants in toxic amounts"), Pub. L.
No. 92-500, § 110 (a)(1)-(3) (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)-(3)).
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minimizing its adverse short-term economic impacts. Resulting benefits
of a well-designed climate change policy include improvements in
existing air quality and public health and the diversification of the
nation's fuel mix.
Prompt and meaningful domestic actions coupled with a
panoply of policy tools can achieve the goal of climate stabilization
without incurring unacceptably high compliance costs, provided that
their implementation is well-coordinated under an ideally designed
national strategy. By directly addressing the issue of "scale," i.e., the total
amount of natural resources exploited and their by-products such as
wastes, 14 climate change policy has the potential to bring sustainability
concerns into economic decision making, especially given the lack of
commercially viable GHG reduction technologies. In this way, climate
change policy can create a necessary precondition for inducing lifestyle
changes and technological innovation, two essential factors contributing
to the ultimate success in moving toward an ecologically balanced, less
carbon-intensive human civilization. To summarize, the successful
implementation of climate change policy will be the key to attaining the
overarching goal of sustainable development.
This Article aims to discuss, in detail, the ideal design features of
a successful domestic GHG emissions trading program, which should be
an integral part of future U.S. climate change policy. Based on the
nation's prior experiences with emissions trading in other policy areas,
the Article's messages are two-fold: (1) emissions trading or any other
kind of economic incentive-based system should be carefully designed
after taking into account all relevant factors impacting its effectiveness,
and (2) emissions trading should be used in the context of climate change
policy to assist future climate change mitigation efforts, along with other
available policy tools.
This Article analyzes the program elements of GHG emissions
trading under both the European Union's CO 2 Emissions Trading
Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act as proposed by Senators John
McCain and Joseph Lieberman in 2003. Part I provides a short summary
of delivery mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and briefly explains
14. The term "scale" is used by ecological economists as meaning "the physical scale or
size of the human presence in the ecosystem, as measured by population times per capita
resource use." HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 28, 50 (1996). Pointing out that current rates of economic growth cannot be

continued indefinitely, ecological economics tries to address three aspects of sustainability:
overpopulation, overconsumption, and technological sufficiency, which all boil down to
the issue of scale. In this way, the concept of development is translated into a "qualitative"
one, and, hence, "environmental sustainability" becomes an integral component of
sustainable development.
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why emissions trading should be employed in the climate change policy
context. It then considers the theoretical underpinnings of economic
approaches to environmental protection, such as emissions trading or
pollution taxes, and discusses air emissions trading in the United States.
Part I also observes that pollution taxes (or a carbon tax in the context of
domestic climate change policy) would not gain sufficient political
currency in the political and legal environment of the United States
despite the taxes' theoretical appeal. Part II discusses the ideal design
features of a successful domestic GHG emissions trading program and
examines the elements of both the European Union's CO2 Emissions
Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act. Part III introduces
several studies that have estimated the economic effects of the Climate
Stewardship Act. The Article concludes that domestic climate change
policy can be implemented in a cost-effective manner and stresses the
urgent need for the United States to take domestic action on climate
change.

I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR A FUTURE CLIMATE POLICY
A. Introduction
1. Delivery Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol
In addition to independent domestic action, the Kyoto Protocol
permits contracting parties to utilize three types of flexibility
mechanisms to meet GHG reduction targets: international emissions
trading, joint implementation (I), and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). The Protocol allocates to each Annex B country an
assigned amount of emissions reduction units (AAUs) that are equal to
5
the nation's allowable GHG emissions.' Each Annex B country is
allowed to trade or sell emissions reduction units with another Annex B
country in order to comply with its GHG reduction obligation under the
Protocol. 16

15. Annex B of the Protocol lists parties that assume GHG reduction obligations and
establishes the specific reduction target for each of these countries that must be achieved
during the first commitment period. Therefore, a country's AAUs are allocated in an
amount that is equal to its baseline emissions minus the percentage of emission reductions
required under the Kyoto Protocol. Annex B countries include developed countries and
Russia and other former Communist countries in Eastern Europe, technically termed
"economies in transition." Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3. & Annex B.
16. Id. art. 17.
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Both JI and the CDM are project-based credit-trading
mechanisms that permit any Annex B country, or private entities thereof,
to earn emissions reduction units by engaging in a project that helps
another contracting party decrease its GHG emissions, e.g., through
energy efficiency upgrading, or to increase GHG removal capacity of
carbon sinks, e.g., through reforestation. The only difference between the
two is that JI is to be implemented between Annex B countries that can
transact with each other's emissions reduction units (ERUs), which are
created as a result of implementation of qualifying projects,17 whereas
under the CDM, Annex B countries can obtain certified emissions
reduction units (CERs) by carrying out projects within non-Annex B
8
countries.
Compliance with the Protocol is determined after considering
improvements in GHG removal capacity by sinks generated through
eligible human-induced, land-based activities, officially termed land-use,
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities that have been
conducted within the territory of each of the Annex B countries during
the relevant commitment period. 19 Each Annex B country may
implement JI or CDM projects designed to help other Annex B or nonAnnex B countries enhance their removal capacity by sinks and then use
the newly created credits for its own compliance purposes.
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol gives each Annex B country enough
leeway to meet its individual GHG reduction obligation; it may proceed
with the go-it-alone approach or it is allowed to create a link between
implementation of its domestic GHG reduction programs and
international emissions trading and/or other project-based credit trading
programs. Although some restrictions have been placed on the manner
in which reduction credits are generated and used by carrying out
forestry projects, 20 the Kyoto Protocol does not limit the maximum
17. Id. art. 6.
18. Id. art. 12.
19. Id. art. 6. 1(d); see U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of its Sixth Session, held at Bonn
from 16 to 27 July 2001, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2001/5, Sept. 25, 2001, at 45 [hereinafter Bonn
Agreements].
20. The Bonn Agreements and the Marrakesh Accords impose several restrictions on
forestry activities. First, the total GHG emissions reductions Annex B parties can claim
from both human-induced forest management and JI-related forestry activities must be
limited to a total of 54 megatons of carbon, a little more than two percent of aggregate
emissions from Annex B countries, which were apportioned among Annex B countries
according to the formula contained in Appendix Z. Id. at 46 and 47, Ann. Z; see also Report
of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh, 29 October to 10
November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, Part Two, Vol. I, at 63, Annex, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002) [hereinafter Marrakesh Accords] (doubling the cap for
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number of credits that can be generated by other types of land-based
sink-creating activity. Nor does it expressly put a quantitative ceiling on
the total amount of GHGs to be covered by opting-in to flexibility
mechanisms. 21 Notably, the Protocol does not impose any restrictions on
GHG emissions trading or "burden-sharing" within a regional bloc,
which may be established by an agreement between two or more Annex
B countries so long as bloc-wide actual emissions do not exceed the
22
combined AAUs of each of the participating countries.
2. Viability of Using Incentive-Based Economic Approaches in the Climate
Change Context
Carbon dioxide and other GHGs are not classified as regulated
air pollutants in the United States. Because CO 2 and other GHGs are
airborne substances, they theoretically may be regulated by the CAA.
Under the CAA, the term "air pollutant" is defined as "any air pollution
agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical,
biological, radioactive (including source material, special nuclear
material, and byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted
23
into or otherwise enters the ambient air." Further, section 103(g) of the
24
CAA specifically lists CO 2 as an air pollutant. In view of these
forest management-related credits for Russia). Second, "[aifforestation and reforestation
projects [should] be the only eligible [LULUCF] activities under the CDM during the first
commitment period." Bonn Agreements, supra note 19, at 44. Qualifying afforestation and
reforestation CMD project activities account only for a maximum of one percent of base
year emissions, multiplied by five, that a party may use toward its first commitment period
goals. Id. at 46. Third, the use of early reduction credits shall not be allowed, except in the
CDM context. See Marrakesh Accords, supra note 20, pt. 2, vol. II, at 23. Fourth, Annex B
countries may use banked GHG emission credits in any subsequent commitment period,
but "removal units" (RMUs) earned from eligible human-induced LULUCF activities,
including JI projects, carried out in Annex B countries may not be banked. Id. The amount
of bankable credits earned from JI and CDM projects is limited to 2.5 percent of the nation's
AAUs. Id. at 61.
21. Articles 6 and 17 use the phrase "shall be supplemental to domestic actions." See
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, arts. 6, 17. While a reasonable reading of the text indicates that
the Protocol appears to require "supplementarity," it does not impose any limit on the
percentage of emissions reduction credits that any Annex B country may use toward
meeting its emissions reduction target.
22. Id. art. 4. The European Union operates as one entity under this article, and has
moved to craft an EU-wide emissions trading regime. The original 15 EU member nations
in 1998 agreed to a "burden-sharing target" and jointly ratified the Kyoto Protocol on May
31, 2002. See European Council, Council Decision 2002/358/CE: Council Decision of 25
April 2002 Concerning the Approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto
Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Joint Fulfillment
of Commitments Thereunder (May 31, 2002).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).
24. Id. § 7403(g) (1).

Fall 2005]

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

provisions and the Act's clean air goal, the CAA can be interpreted in a
manner that gives the federal government the authority to regulate
C0 2.25

Because sole reliance on administrative rulemaking requires too
much time and too many resources to be viable, emissions limits for
GHGs should be established by Congress through amendments to the
CAA or by enacting special legislation in order for the regulation of
GHGs under the CAA to succeed. 26 Given that technological solutions
have yet to be developed, however, implementation of congressionally
set enforceable emissions limitations would entail high short-term
compliance costs to the nation's economy and, thus, would not be
politically acceptable. Along with initiating aggressive legal reforms in
the energy sector, implementation of economic incentive-based systems,
such as emissions trading and pollution taxes, should become an integral
part of national climate change mitigation policy.
One of the strengths of an incentive-based system lies in its
potential to reduce transaction costs provided that the problem of
monitoring emissions accurately can be solved. An incentive-based
system is relatively easy to administer, does not dictate the use of any
specific compliance methods, and can create quasi-market forces,
thereby aligning the functioning of environmental regulation with a
25. Notwithstanding its contrary 1998 tentative legal conclusion, strong outside
pressures led the EPA to withdraw from the previous position. Compare U.S. EPA, EPA's
Authority to Regulate Pollutants emitted by Electric Power Generation sources,
Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, Gen. Counsel (Apr. 10, 1998), available
at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/bpercival/casebook/documents/EPAC02
memol.pdf, with U.S. EPA, EPA's Authority to Impose Mandatory Controls to Address
Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act, Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant,
Gen. Counsel (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/environment/
casebook/documents/EPACO2memo2.pdf; U.S. EPA, Control of Emissions from New
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922 (Sept. 8, 2003) (denying petition for
rulemaking on GHG emissions from mobile sources).
26. The CAA's state implementation plan (SIP) process, which is designed to strike the
proper power balance between the federal government and states under the Constitution,
has been very cumbersome and time consuming. Revisions to the national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS) have always been the subject of intense debate between
environmental and health organizations and some states and industry groups. In
particular, states and industries fear that the newly-revised NAAQS could subject them to
more onerous schedules of compliance and requirements under the CAA. Although section
109(d), added to the CAA during the 1977 amendments, requires the EPA to review the
NAAQS every five years after 1980, the NAAQS were amended only a few times during
the past 35 years. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2000). Legal battles surrounding the new PM2 5
and eight-hour ozone NAAQS demonstrate the fact that the Act's SIP process is inadequate
to deal with climate change issues. See Am. Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.
1999), reh'g denied in partand granted in part, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), affid in part and rev'd
in part sub nom., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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firm's profit motives. Emissions trading or a carbon tax system can be
employed in the global climate change policy context in order to reduce
compliance costs and make the smooth transition to a less carbonintensive economy possible.
Sources of GHG emissions are too ubiquitous to be brought
technology-based, command-and-control regulation.
traditional
under
Compliance costs vary between sources and regions. There are no
significant monitoring problems because the carbon content of a fossil
fuel can easily be used instead of a direct, real-time emissions monitoring
system, which is often too expensive to be required of smaller sources. In
addition, as far as the electric power sector is concerned, GHG emissions
trading can be successfully implemented without requiring significant
additional costs by building on a multi-pollutant trading system, which
has been developed incrementally over the last decade. 27 We have much
27. Beginning with the enactment of the CAA's Title IV SO2 allowance trading
program in 1990, large electric utilities and some large industrial boiler units have
incrementally become part of various air emissions trading programs. Under CAA sections
176A and 184, northeastern states comprising the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC),
except Virginia, agreed to implement a regional NOx cap-and-trade program in 1994 and
finalized a model rule for NOx allowance trading in 1996, which would be implemented by
participating states beginning in 1999. See id. §§ 7506a, 7511c; LAUREL J. CARLSON,
NESCAUM/MARAMA NOx BUDGET MODEL RULE (1996), availableat http://www.epa.gov
/airmarkets/otc/otcrule.zip (last visited Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinafter OTC NOx CAP-ANDTRADE MODEL RULE]. Relying on its authority under CAA section 110(k) to force states to
amend their SIPs upon a finding of "significant contribution" to another state's NAAQS
attainment or maintenance, called a "SIP call," the EPA in 1998 made a NOx SIP call against
22 eastern states and the District of Columbia. The NOx SIP call gave the states the
flexibility to choose which sources to target and which mix of control measures was needed
to achieve the required NOx emissions reductions. Its most significant feature, however,
was its requirement that the states allocate a budget for fossil-fuel-fired electric steam
generating units, with the option to participate in an EPA-administered regional cap-andtrade program. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5) (2000); U.S. EPA, Finding of Significant
Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group
Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone; Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
57,356 (Oct. 27,1998). The EPA's NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP), which was designed
to help states implement the 1998 NOx SIP call, was launched on May 1, 2003, in eight OTC
states and the District of Columbia and thereby replaced the OTC NOx cap-and-trade
program for these states. Beginning on May 31, 2004, eleven other states subject to the NOx
SIP call joined the EPA's NBP. See U.S. EPA, EPA-430-R-04-010, NOx BUDGET TRADING
PROGRAM: 2003 PROGRESS AND COMPLIANCE REPORT (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter EPA NBP
REPORT FOR 2003]. On January 30, 2004, the EPA published proposed rules that would
adopt an emission trading mechanism for reducing SO2, NOx, and mercury emissions from
electric utilities. Based on the new ozone and PM standards, the proposed rules covered 29
states and the District of Columbia for PM25-related S02 and NOx emissions and 25 states
and the District of Columbia for NOx emissions, with the main features being a lowered
cap on S02 emissions and/or year-round NOx reduction requirements. See U.S. EPA, Rule
to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Interstate Air Quality
Rule), 69 Fed. Reg. 4566 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004); Proposed National Emission Standards
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to learn about the promises and pitfalls of emissions trading from
previous experience with multi-pollutant trading in the electric power
sector.
Economic incentive systems can and should be utilized to help
the nation achieve a carbon reduction goal in a cost-effective manner.
Establishing a link between a domestic trading program and
international GHG emissions trading and other flexibility mechanisms,
together with the deployment of various policy tools designed to
facilitate sustainable energy development at home, would further bring
down compliance costs.
B. An Examination of Economic Theories for Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation
1. The PigouvianPrice-BasedApproach
For a moment, consider the theoretical underpinnings of
economic approaches to environmental protection. The rationale
supporting an incentive-based approach is that such an approach
simulates market conditions, giving owners incentives to reduce
pollution. According to economists, environmental pollution occurs due
to the lack of a well-functioning market for a clean environment. One of
the earliest pioneers in this area was British economist A.C. Pigou, who
explained pollution problems as a market failure because pollution
for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance
for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 69 Fed.
Reg. 4652 (proposed Jan. 30, 2004). On March 10, 2005, the EPA issued final interstate air
quality rules based on the proposed rules. In the final rules, EPA made relatively minor
changes to the proposed rules by reducing the number of covered states subject to fine
particle-related SO2 and NOx reduction requirements based on new modeling results, by
adding such new features as opt-in requirements and by deciding to apply new NOx
reduction requirements in 2009 instead of 2010. See U.S. EPA, Rule to Reduce Interstate
Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Interstate Air Quality Rule); Revisions to
Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96); U.S. EPA, Standards of Performance for
New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg.
28,606 (May 18, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 60, 63, 72, 75). Hence, a "three-pollutant"
trading scheme will soon emerge. There is a possibility that "four-pollutant" trading will
take off in the foreseeable future, possibly including some other large industrial sources for
which accurate monitoring systems can be implemented without creating significant
technical and/or financial problems. The so-called "four-pollutant" bill, called the Clean
Power Act, was introduced in the Senate to mandate reductions in SOZ, NOx, mercury, and
C02 emissions from electric power generators using a cap-and-trade approach on a
pollutant-by-pollutant basis. See S. 556, 107th Cong. (2001); S.366, H.R. 2042, 108th Cong.
(2003). President George W. Bush instead has pushed the "Clear Skies" Initiative (threepollutant bill), excluding C02 from its coverage. S.485, H.R. 999,108th Cong. (2003).
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generates external costs ("negative externalities") to society. He called
for taxes on pollution as a solution. 28 For this reason, pollution taxes are
oftentimes called Pigouvian taxes, and Pigou represents a school of
economic thought advocating the use of price-based controls or liability
rules to control pollution.
In economic terms, the rate of taxes should be equal to the
difference between private marginal production cost and social marginal
production cost.29 Pigouvian taxation is close to technology-based,
command-and-control regulation; command-and-control regulation also
imposes government-set compliance costs on regulated firms, creating
an economic incentive for firms to reduce pollution only to the extent
that marginal compliance costs do not exceed marginal abatement
costs.

30

While a tax system or liability scheme would be relatively easy
to administer with minimal cost and would generate an additional
revenue stream that could be used for environmental clean-up or other
beneficial purposes, 31 it must be able to accurately assess environmental
harm in order to function properly. 32 To provide firms with an adequate
incentive to reduce pollution, a tax rate must be initially set at a level
exceeding the marginal cost of pollution control. 33 Otherwise, the tax
leads to under- or over-protection of public health and environmental
quality.
The problem facing legislatures and economists is that it is not
always easy to calibrate a tax rate or the amount of damages adequate to
achieve pollution reduction goals in the real world. This is due to an
"imperfect knowledge of [the nature] and the cost structures and price

28. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932). Note that Pigou
did not actually use the term externalities.
29. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMIcS 41, fig. 2.15 (2000).
30. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:Replacing
the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289, 305
(1998) ("Traditional regulation offers little
incentive to spend additional monies to reduce
pollution more than necessary to protect oneself from enforcement penalties, when the
costs of doing so exceed the costs of adequate compliance.").
31. Pollution taxes have dual benefits: improvement in both environmental quality
and economic efficiency from "the use of environmental tax revenues to reduce other taxes
such as income taxes that distort labor supply and saving decisions." In the economics
literature, this is called the "double dividend" effect. See Don Fullerton & Gilbert E.
Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect
Somethingfor Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 221, 221 (1998).
32.

See WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION

73-78 (1974).
33.

Driesen, supra note 30, at 340.
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elasticities of firms." 34 A tax system or a liability scheme can also distort
labor incentives. This distortion occurs when a tax rate or a damage
award is set at such a high level that it could adversely impact some
industries and regions disproportionately and reduce disposable
personal income. 35 Therefore, in order to avoid the economic inefficiency
problem, and ensuing public opposition, the revenues collected must be
recycled to reduce taxes on income, capital, and labor 36 and to
compensate the hardest-hit industries, regions, and low-income
37
households.
2. The Coasean Quantity-Based Approach
Another school of economics supports quantity-based or
property-based policy tools such as emissions trading. In 1960, Ronald
H. Coase published his seminal writing, The Problem of Social Cost.38 In
this article, he faulted the Pigouvian solution as too idealistic and
inefficient, pointing out that "the problem [the policymaker faces in
establishing a system aimed at internalizing externalities] is [the
difficulty of] devis[ing] practical arrangements which will correct defects
in one part of the system without causing more serious harm in other
parts." 39 In Coase's view, Pigou started from the mistaken belief that
"any measure which will remove the deficiency [of unregulated
pollution] is necessarily desirable," 40 and overlooked the difficulties in
executing a policy that is aimed at eliminating a divergence between
private and social products. 41 He argued for a social wealth-maximizing
34. Gary E. Marchant, Global Warming: Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset
Policyfor Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 632 (1992).
35. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 353-56 (1986) (pointing out
the difficulty of "setting the correct tax rates" and the regressivity of proportional pollution
taxes); J. Andrew Hoerner, Breath and Taxes: Air Pollution Taxes in the Works, 46 TAX NOTES
1356, 1357 (1990) (quoting Edward F. Mitchell of the Edison Electric Institute as saying that
an emissions tax under consideration by Congress would raise the cost of electricity,
thereby having an impact which is "regressive, and will disproportionately penalize lowand fixed-income residential customers," and restating a remark by Stan Garnett of the
Coalition for Acid Rain Equity as saying that "an emissions tax would be an unfair burden
on the midwest").
36. Richard L. Ottinger & William B. Moore, The Casefor State Pollution Taxes, 12 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 103, 106 (1994).
37. POSNER, supra note 35, at 355 (stating that, "to assure proportionality or
progressivity of the tax system, comprehensive pollution taxes would require exemptions,
rebates, or compensating changes elsewhere in the tax system").
38. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
39. Id. at 34. Cf. POSNER, supra note 35, at 357 (contending that "emission standards
require cost-benefit analysis; pollution taxes require only benefit analysis").
40. Coase, supra note 38, at 43.
41. Id. at 41-42.
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solution contingent on individual circumstances, observing that, "[wihen
an economist is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper
procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by these
different arrangements." 42 In a world without transaction costs and other
obstacles to market transactions, voluntary negotiations between the
parties will result in the Pareto-superior outcome, maximizing
aggregated social wealth, 43 and "the decision of the courts concerning
liability for damage would be without effect on the allocation of
45
resources." 44 This proposition is known as the "Coase Theorem."
Coase framed environmental problems "as a competition over
conflicting uses for scarce resources."46 He postulated that when
transaction costs are near to zero, the bargaining parties would reach an
agreement whereby the natural resource at issue is put to a higher
valued use. Direct government intervention, Coase observed, in the
market would not be justified where its own costs are expected to
outweigh the gains that might come from regulating socially harmful
47
behavior.
Coase did recognize, however, that market-based solutions do
not always lead to the efficient outcome, saying that government

42. Id. at 34.
43. See id. at 2-15. A transaction is Pareto superior when at least one party is better off
from the result of it and no other parties are worse off. For the standard definition of Pareto
superiority, see J. Coleman, Efficiency, Auction and Exchange, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE
LAW 72 (1988).
44. Coase, supra note 38, at 10. In other words, the issue of who owns or controls the
property at issue is irrelevant to the final outcome. See also Ronald H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 (1959) ("[Tlhe delimitation of rights is an
essential prelude to market transactions; but the ultimate result is independent of the legal
decision."); A. MITCHELL POT.INSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 12 (1983)
("If there are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regardless of the choice
of legal rule.").
45. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1982) ("The basic idea of
the theorem is that the structure of the law which assigns property rights and liability does
not matter so long as transaction costs are nil; bargaining will result in an efficient outcome
no matter who bears the burden of liability."); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes,
A Unified Theory of Justice: The Integration of Fairnessinto Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REV. 249, 259
(1998) (restating the Coase Theorem as follows: "if all parties to be affected by a given
situation could bargain costlessly, and if each potentially-affected party could come to the
table with complete knowledge of all relevant factors, then the parties, in pursuing their
preferences, would reach an agreement that would allocate their respective rights,
obligations, and entitlements in a manner that would maximize the situation's total
output").
46. Terry L. Anderson & J.Bishop Grewell, From Local to Global Property: Privatizingthe
Global Environment?: Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or TopDown?, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 73, 73 (1999).
47. Coase, supra note 38, at 17-18.
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regulation would be the preferred option "when, as is normally the case
with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people is involved and when
therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the
firm may be high." 48 Coase stressed the importance of a case-by-case
approach to solving market dysfunctions; the role of the judge or the law
should be to maximize social utility by "choosing the appropriate social
49
arrangement for dealing with the [problem at hand]."
Coase's article has been extremely influential in law and
economics literature and is one of the most cited and debated law review
articles. His strong influence on public policy making is found both in
the recent trend toward incentive-based regulation in public utility
industries and the cost-benefit analysis requirement imposed on
administrative agencies by presidential orders.
There is no doubt that the Coase Theorem has limits when
applied to the field of environmental law. As Coase himself recognized,
because environmental problems so often involve many parties, "the cost
of bringing together and coordinating such large numbers of
stakeholders" can be prohibitively high.5 ° Another problem lies in the
public good or common-pool resource characteristics of many
environmental amenities. 51 In order for Coasian bargaining to work,
property rights to the clean environment must be effectively defined and
enforceable by government.5 2 Otherwise, public ownership would result
in degradation or over-consumption of these common goods by
promoting free-riding behavior or ruinous competition by resource
53
users.
Property-based rules are also susceptible to the holdout
problem, which tends to be more magnified when the number of people
involved increases. This problem could be the result of strategic behavior
48.
49.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 18-19.

50. See STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS:
THEORY, POLICY, AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 130 (2001).

51. Id.
52. Anderson & Grewell, supranote 46, at 76.
53. Public goods have two characteristics: nonrivalrous consumption and nonexcludability. This means that the benefits of the supply of a public good must be shared by
all others. Thus, public goods are highly likely to be undersupplied, because people have
little incentive to voluntarily contribute to the production of these goods. See COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 29, at 42-43. On the other hand, commonly shared, commercially valuable
open-access resources, such as fish stocks, are characterized by "subtractability, meaning
that resource units appropriated by one party subtract from what is available to others."
HACKETr, supra note 50, at 100. Therefore, rivalry among resource users tends to lead to
unsustainable harvest patterns and makes it difficult for a common solution based on
cooperation to have efficacy.
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or exceedingly high valuation of his property by an individual person.5 4
Transaction costs are further increased by scientific uncertainty
surrounding the level of harm or risk posed by environmental hazards
and uncertainty regarding the appropriate amount of compensation for
the harm caused by the hazard. Conversely, scientific consensus
facilitates cooperative behavior by minimizing friction among
stakeholders, thus making it easier for stakeholders to agree on solutions
to the problem in question.5 5
A Coasean solution to an environmental problem is also
problematic because it can instill the notion of a property right to pollute.
Moreover, when transaction costs are high, initial assignments of
property rights have wealth distribution effects. Therefore, the success of
the Coasean approach hinges on a well-developed property rights
regime. A well-developed property rights regime must reduce
transaction costs, including costs related to acquiring and processing
perfect information, to a manageable level. The regime must also have
mechanisms to enforce property rights, effectively preventing gaming
behavior like free riding and holdouts that often plague natural resource
management. However, establishing such an ideal regime may be
difficult given the complexities and unpredictability that inhere in
natural resource systems.
Nonetheless, property right regimes arise when it becomes
economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and

54. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-08 (1972). The Japanese
history of sunlight regulation exemplifies the problems with property-based rules. Japan
has a high population density; the majority of the Japanese population is concentrated in a
small number of metropolitan areas. A construction boom in the 1960s generated numerous
nuisance lawsuits between developers and property owners because nearby tall buildings
obstructed local residents' access to sunlight. Bruce Yandle, From Local to Global Commons:
PrivateProperty, Common Property,and Hybrid Property Regimes: Graspingfor the Heavens: 3-D
Property Rights and the Global Commons, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 13, 20 (1999). Local
governments initially responded to this problem by assigning the right to a certain
minimum amount of sunlight to property owners. Developers were required to "obtain
unanimous consent from all affected property owners" if they "wished to secure airspace
in order to construct a building." Id. at 20-21. Municipalities enforced this property right to
air and light by delaying construction approvals or by "deny[ing] developers connection to
the water supply or sewage system" to those who failed to "gain unanimous support of
affected residents." Id. Because of the high transaction costs and the holdout problem
associated with developers' negotiations with local residents, the national government
finally intervened and replaced local sunshine rights with nationwide building codes that
established standards for "the 'emission' of shadows extending beyond a building site." Id.
at 25-26.
55. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons,
30 ENvTL. L. 241, 258-62, 271-74 (2000).
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costs because of factors that transform the preexisting cost-and-benefit
equation, such as the emergence of new technologies and techniques or
changes in market values of certain goods and services.56 Thus, increased
reliance on property-based rules for air emissions control and natural
resource management is indicative of incremental changes in human
institutions: (1) natural resources have become scarce commodities of
economic value, and (2) technological solutions to demarcate natural
boundaries and/or to enforce property rights have begun to be
developed. 57 Although bottom-up private property rights regimes have
yet to emerge, top-down regulated property rights have emerged in
58
some areas of environmental and natural resources law.
3. The Dominance of Technology-Based Standardsand the Presumptive
Superiority of the Price-BasedApproach versus the Quantity-BasedApproach
a. Theoretical Support for the Use of Pollution Taxes
The above discussion explains why, since the 1970s,
government-imposed technology-based standards or liability rules have
supplanted common law tort remedies.5 9 Further, it explains why money
damages, rather than injunctions, have become the dominant remedy for
those who suffered personal injuries or property damages due to
harmful pollutant discharges. 6°
The standard explanation for the shift is that when transaction
costs are so high as to prevent private bargaining, liability rules are
preferable to property rules, with the caveat that "damages can be
61
computed with reasonable accuracy," or vice versa. In recent years, this
commonly held view has been challenged. Many within the academic
circle prefer pollution taxes or liability rules to property-based
instruments such as tradeable allowances. Academics argue that liability
rules are presumptively superior to property rules in controlling harmful
56. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967).
57. See Anderson & Grewell, supra note 46, at 77-78.
58. Id. at 88-93. Professor Yandle observed that "the politics of special interests" can
block the use of bottom-up property rights even when the costs of enforcement are lower
than the benefits. See Yandle, supra note 54, at 31-36.
59. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Overview and Critique:A Century ofAir Pollution Control
Law: What's Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549,1555-69 (1991).
60. See, e.g., Oscar H. Boomer et al. v. At. Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)
(denying the issuance of permanent injunctions to plaintiffs on the ground of "the large
disparity in economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction").
61. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral
in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 456 (1995). For one of the earliest seminal writings,
see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 54.
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externalities even when barriers to voluntary market transactions are
eliminated by well-defined property rules. According to academics, this
is so because liability rules would promote sincere negotiations between
the parties by removing perverse incentives to hide subjective valuation,
which may still remain on the part of property owners even in cases of
low transaction costs. 62 When there is great uncertainty about the
magnitude of harm, partial compensation by liability rules both induces
polluters to reduce environmental harm and creates incentives for
potential victims to avoid such harm.63
According to advocates of the Pigouvian approach, pollution
taxes are more efficient than tradeable pollution permits "chiefly because
the price instruments are thought to perform better under uncertainty, to
raise valuable revenues, and to avoid transaction costs." 64 On the other
hand, "the government's estimates of costs [that become the basis for
setting the total quantity of allowable pollution] are likely to be
inaccurate, so the price of tradeable rights is likely to be incorrect." 65 In
their view, pollution trading would not be expected to reduce pollution
to the socially optimal level. This is a bit of an overstatement, however,
considering that getting the tax rate right is also a difficult task for the
government. Yet, there is some merit to an argument favoring pollution
taxes in that it echoes a general belief that a viable market for tradeable
pollution rights can rarely exist unless government makes the right
decision and clears all market barriers to free trade. These preconditions
cannot easily be satisfied in the real world.
In fact, there is no hard evidence that emissions trading works
simply because it can either harness market power or induce
technological innovation. The success of both lead and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) trading can be ascribed to the law's phase-out mandate. 66

62. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
63. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, PropertyRights and Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1996). Note that the authors argue for the general
superiority of liability rules versus property rules. See id. at 720 ("Our conclusion about the
superiority of the liability rule might not follow, though, if courts were systematically to
underestimate harm in setting damages, rather than to use estimates of harm that are
correct on average."); id. at 721 ("[T]here is a primafacie case favoring liability rules over
property rules for controlling harmful externalities, but property rule protection may
become desirable on account of one or more of the factors mentioned above.").
64. Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 682 (1999).
65. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 63, at 750-51.
66. The principal reason for the success of lead trading was attributable to (1) the
clarity and stringency of the regulations, and (2) "personnel at different refineries.. .were
accustomed to conducting business with each other." See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.
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In the case of sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) allowance trading, utilities have been
able to comply with the applicable emissions limit by switching to lowsulfur western coal or by installing scrubbers, without incurring
significant additional costs. Fuel switching or blending has been the
dominant compliance method thanks to the availability of inexpensive
supplies of western coal. 67 Congress and some state public utility
commissions (PUCs) encouraged the use of scrubbers by setting aside
bonus allowances to grandfathered coal-fired units and by generously
allowing the recovery of capital investments.68
Reliance on post-combustion controls like scrubbers also has
negative implications for future efforts to address climate change.
Scrubbers will increase the costs of limiting CO 2 emissions because they
do not actually help to reduce CO2 emissions; over 97 percent of carbon
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice,16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 390 (1989).
In the case of ozone depletion, the vivid picture of ozone holes in the polar regions sent a
strong message to the world community, leading to prompt and decisive action under the
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. Another important factor that helped the
world community to reach consensus on the phase out of CFCs was the small number of
CFC manufacturers and the availability of alternatives to CFCs. American manufacturers
such as DuPont wanted to seize the opportunity to sell alternative products in the world
market while avoiding more stringent reduction requirements under U.S. domestic law. See
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 541-43 (2002);
Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarkable, and
Remarkably Particular,19 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 49, 57-62 (2000).
67. See Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standardof Performance:An Analysis of the
Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,411, 10,416 (1996); DALLAS BURTRAW
& KAREN PALMER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTrURE, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 03-15, THE
PAPARAZZI TAKE A LOOK AT A LIVING LEGEND: THE SO 2 CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR
POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at 22-23 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.rff.
org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-03-15.pdf; U.S. EIA, DOE/EIA-0582, THE EFFECTS OF TITLE TV
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 ON ELECTRIC UTILmES: AN UPDATE, figs. ES-1,
ES-2 (Mar. 1997).
68. Up to 3.5 million extension allowances were given to coal-fired units that install a
"qualifying Phase I technology." 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(d) (2000). These bonus allowances had
the purpose of encouraging the use of high-sulfur coal - and the installation of scrubbers at the eligible affected units. Id. § 7651a(19). The SO2 Acid Rain program contains other
provisions that offer benefits to old coal-fired units, such as an extension of the compliance
deadline and financial assistance. See id. §§ 7651h(b)(1), 7651n(b)(3) ("repowered" sources);
id. § 7651n(b)(1)-(2), (c) ("clean coal" demonstration projects); id. § 7651d(a)(3) (bonus
allowances for listed existing coal-fired units during Phase II). Some of the state PUCs
promoted the continued use of high-sulfur coal to protect local coal producers and miners'
jobs, discouraging other activities, including allowance trading, that could have had
negative impacts on the pursuit of their policy goal. See, e.g., James J. Winebrate et al.,
Estimating the Impacts of Restrictions on Utility Participationin the S02 Allowance Market, ELEC.
J., May 1995, at 50; Douglas R. Bohi, Utilities and State Regulators Are Failing to Take
Advantage of Emission Allowance Trading, ELEC. J., Mar. 1994, at 20; Phased Implementation of
Acid Rain Is Program'sWorst Flaw, EPA Official Says, DAILY ENV'T REP., June 23, 1995, at A-
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emissions are oxidized during combustion.69 Thus, it is no surprise that
utilities with scrubber units, most of which are concentrated in the
Midwest region, have resisted legislative attempts to enact carbon
reduction requirements. 70
From a theoretical standpoint, the current SO 2 allowance trading
program is not perfectly designed. The emissions limitation standard
under the SO 2 Acid Rain Program has been phased-in, 71 and the Phase II
SO 2 requirement of 1.20 pounds (lbs) per million (m) British Thermal
Unit (Btu) is actually the three-decade-old SO 2 new source performance
standard (NSPS) for coal-fired units. SO 2 allowances were allocated nongratis based on an input-based formula, 72 and auctions have been used in
a non-revenue raising manner on a very limited basis. 73 In other words,
the SO2 Acid Rain Program continues the dichotomy between new and
old units, creating an uneven playing field in favor of older, dirtier

69. U.S. GHG EMISSIONS AND SINKS FOR 1999-2001, supranote 1, at 2-14 n.20.
70. Edward A. Smeloff, Utility Deregulation and Global Warming: The Coming Collision,
12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 280, 285 (1998) (stating that "[1]eaving the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions to some future date will make them harder to resolve because
some investments in clean air compliance may not be recovered in a competitive market").
71. In Phase I, which began on January 1, 1995, 263 affected units received SO2
allowances equal to an emissions rate of 2.5 lbs/mm Btu times average fuel consumption
rates in the baseline years divided by 2000. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(a)(2). The 2.5 lbs/mm Btu
emissions limitation was to be reduced to 1.2 lbs/mm Btu after January 1, 2000, when the
Phase II program became effective. Id. § 7651c(a)(1).
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c(a)(2), 7651d.
73. See id. § 7651o. Congress authorized the EPA to set up a special reserve of
allowances for sales to eligible independent power producers (IPPs) and new and existing
affected units required to hold allowances under the S02 Acid Rain Program, and even any
other person or entity that would want to buy SO 2 allowances. Id. To establish such a
special reserve, the EPA must take 2.8 percent of each Phase I source's annual allowances
from 1995 through 1999 and 2.8 percent of the basic Phase II allocation of allowances for
each year beginning in 2000. Id. § 7651o(b). The EPA must transfer the proceeds from the
auction, on a pro rata basis, to the owners or operators of affected unit(s) at an affected
source from whom allowances were withheld. Id. § 7651o(d)(3)(B). Therefore, the SO 2
allowance trading program does not provide for a "revenue-recycling" mechanism. And
EPA-administered auctions are to be held on a very limited basis. For most of the time,
average auction prices have been kept at a lower level than SO 2 allowance prices in the
secondary market. See U.S. EPA, Acid Rain Program Allowance Auctions (1993-2005), at http:
//www.epa.gov/airmarkets/auctions/index.html (last updated May 5, 2005). Generally
speaking, auction prices have shown a similar fluctuation pattern as that of SO2 allowance
prices in the trading market. The reason for the low prices appears to be that the number of
bidders has been extremely low, with a few large utilities dominating auction processes.
The number of bidders for spot allowances was below 30 in many cases; the number of
bidders for seven-year advance allowances was below ten in most auctions. See id. This
indicates that the availability of various low-cost options has offered little incentive for
most electric utilities to participate in auctions.
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sources.74 While it is certainly true that the program has had the
venerable effect of equalizing applicable emissions limits among existing
sources, its allowance allocation method based on historical heat input
and other operating data places unequal economic burdens on different
utilities, since allowances become valuable commodities in the
marketplace.
Requiring new facilities to purchase SO 2 allowances creates
another entry barrier: the allocation of SO 2 allowances without charge to
existing utilities constitutes "the conveyance of scarcity rents to the
private sector."Th The combined use of output-based emissions standards
and revenue-raising auctions as a primary allocation method would
have spread compliance costs more evenly and promoted greater
economic efficiency. Many economists argue that "the failure to raise
revenue and to use that revenue to offset distorting taxes squanders
much of the cost savings in compliance costs that can be achieved by a
flexible tradeable permit system." 76 One study estimated that the costs of
the SO 2 Acid Rain Program would have been 25 percent less if tradeable
allowances had been auctioned. 77
Although many economists believe that SO 2 allowance prices
marginal abatement cost of compliance, 78 many studies have
the
reflect
74. New facilities that begin operation after December 31, 1995, must purchase
allowances in EPA-administered auctions or from existing sources that have allowances to
sell in the secondary market. 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(g)(3)-(4).
75. ROBERT N. STAVINS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION PAPER No. 03-43,
MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM U.S. EXPERIENCE
(AND RELATED RESEARCH)?, 9 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/
Documents/RFF-DP-03-43.pdf.
76. BURTRAW & PALMER, supra note 67, at 20-21.
77. Lawrence H. Goulder, Ian W.H. Parry, & Dallas Burtraw, Revenue-Raising vs. Other
Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Pre-ExistingTax Distortions,
28 RAND J. ECoN. 708 (1997).

78. The average prices of auctioned allowances or allowances traded in the secondary
market have stayed at a much lower level than expected at the time of enactment. See U.S.
EPA, Allowance Prices (1995-2004), at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/so2market
/alprices.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2004); supra text accompanying note 73. Lower-thanexpected compliance costs, utilities' overcompliance by banking unused allowances, some
of which came from SO 2 reductions at substitution and compensation units, and other
factors that created market distortions may have created an oversupply of SO 2 allowances
and thereby "put downward pressure on prices" in the first several years of the program.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(b); 40 C.F.R. §§ 72.41, 72.43, 72.8(b)(2) (allowing affected units to
acquire additional allowances by designating unaffected existing units as substitution units
or compensating units, or by permanently retiring old units, during Phase I of the
program.); See REITZE, supra note 2, at 264; U.S. EPA, EPA-430-R-03-011, ACID RAIN
PROGRAM: 2002 PROGRESS REPORT 5 (Nov. 2003) [hereinafter 2002 SO2 ACID RAIN PROGRAM

PROGRESS REPORT]. See also U.S. EPA, EPA-430-R-01-008, ACID RAIN PROGRAM: ANNUAL
PROGRESS REPORT, 2000, at 6, exhibit 4 (Aug. 2001) (reporting that the number of
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found that other exogenous factors, such as state public utilities
regulation and utilities' inexperience with emissions trading or "autarkic
behavior," would have impeded the realization of allowance trading's
full potential for cost savings, especially during Phase 1.79 State PUCs
typically required utilities to return all the net gains or losses of
allowance trading to ratepayers, thus limiting real cost savings from
s
trading and dampening utilities' enthusiasm for allowance trading.8
As
noted earlier, some of the state PUCs promoted the use of high-sulfur
coal to protect their local coal industry and discouraged inter-utility
allowance transactions. If inter-firm trading is underutilized, 81 despite
cost disparities among firms, emissions trading would become nothing
but "averaging." Small firms without economies of scale would be
economically disadvantaged; clean units would not benefit from
82
trading.
These observations are not intended to argue that the SO 2
allowance trading program has not succeeded in achieving its goals. By
any account, the program's environmental performance has exceeded
initial expectations thus far.8 3 The program's success becomes more
evident when compared with the CAA's Title IV nitrogen oxides (NOx)
reduction program.8 4 What the above discussion aims to demonstrate is
cumulative banked allowances was about 11.6 million by the end of Phase I, leading to
significant over compliance throughout the Phase I period). Bonus allowances granted to
midwestern sources may have functioned as a partial contributing factor to the oversupply
of SO 2 allowances. See supra text accompanying note 68.
79. BURTRAW & PALMER, supra note 67, at 16-18 (citing a number of studies indicating
the existence of such exogenous factors impeding trading).
80. A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN
PROGRAM 193 (2000).

81. Trading volumes under the S02 Acid Rain Program have been relatively
insignificant. See U.S. EPA, TradingActivity Breakdown (1994-2003), at http://www.epa.gov
/airmarkets/trading/so2market/transtable.html (last updated Oct. 15,2004).
82. The fact that the participation of opt-in units has been minimal may indicate that
allowance trading has failed to provide enough incentive for clean sources to innovate for
the purpose of making economic profits. In 2002, there were only eleven opt-in units,
which produced 99,188 allowances. See 2002 SO 2 ACID RAIN PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT,
supra note 78, at 3, fig. 3.
83. In its 2002 progress report to Congress, the EPA reported that S02 emissions from
electric power plants in 2002 were reduced by 41 percent from the 1980 baseline levels. Id.
at 2.
84. The EPA estimated overall NOx reductions from Phase 11's full implementation at
2.1 million tons per year. U.S. EPA, Factsheets, Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) Reduction under
Phase II of the Acid Rain Program: Group I and Group II Boilers, at http://www.
epa.gov/airmarkt/arp/nox/phase2.html (last updated Oct. 25, 2002). However, the impact
of implementation of the CAA's Title IV NOx reduction program has been rather limited
because the program's requirements are emissions rate-based and, therefore, do not
adequately address increased production at electric utilities in response to increased
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that the program has not been implemented in a manner that is faithful
to the teachings of economic theory. The primary source of the
program's success is not clear: it could be attributable to the emissions
cap, banking, or the lowered cost of western coal.8 5 A viable market for
allowances has not yet been created. Clean and innovative technologies
have not performed better, which might indicate that SO 2 allowance
trading has failed to play a catalytic role in encouraging technological
innovation and the development of clean energy. 86

demand for electricity. While electric utilities' share of national NOx emissions dropped
from 25 percent to 22 percent during the 1996-2001 period, NOx emissions from coal-fired
plants are still responsible for over 85 percent of utility NOx emissions. See U.S. EPA,
Average Annual Emissions, All CriteriaPollutants Years Including 1970-2001, tbl. A-4, at http:
//www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/index.html (last updated Aug. 2003).
85. See Curtis A. Moore, The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments: Failing the Acid Test, 34
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,368 (2004) (stating that, "if any element of the program saved money, it
was almost certainly the cap, not trading").
86. See id. at 10,366 (arguing that "enactment of the trading program is one of the
largest single obstacles confronting those seeking to deploy new [clean and efficient]
technologies [such as integrated gasification-combined cycle (IGCC) and large-scale wind
farm systems]. Acid rain trading has not been a boon to these entrepreneurs, but a
burden."). Congress directed the EPA to set up a Conservation and Renewable Energy
Reserve (CRER) and specifically allocated 300,000 SO2 allowances to energy conservation
and renewable projects implemented by affected units between 1992 and 1999, based on the
calculation of avoided SO2 emissions during that time span. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f), (g).
However, CRER performed very poorly and finally expired after January 1, 2000. It is
understood that the program's failure was due to electricity restructuring at the federal and
state levels that adversely affected electric utilities' incentives to engage in demand-side
management (DSM) and integrated resource planning (IRP) under pre-existing state
programs. See generally DAVID R. WOOLEY, RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, ISSUE BRIEF
No. 15, A GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT FOR THE RENEWABLE ENERGY COMMUNITY 18-19

(Feb. 2000), available at http://www.repp.org/repp-pubs/pdf/caaRen.pdf. Even clean coal
technologies such as IGCC have had difficulty in penetrating the electricity market. IGCC
involves a steam-recycling combustion process pressuring and gasifying coal, thereby
significantly reducing air emissions from coal-fired units. See Moore, supra note 85, at
10,372-73; Henry R. Linden, Bridging the Carbon Gap: Fossil Fuel Use for the 21st Century,
PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 15, 2002, at 40. As of now, there are only two IGCC
electric power plants in the United States. IGCC projects at these two plants began with the
help of financial assistance from the Department of Energy (DOE) prior to or after the 1990
CAA Amendments under the DOE's Clean Coal Technology program. See Moore, supra
note 85, at 10,372-73. The number is not encouraging, given the fact that a total of 38 clean
coal demonstration projects had been implemented between 1985 and 2003. See John A.
Herrick, Federal Project FinancingIncentivesfor Green Industries: Renewable Energy and Beyond,
43 NAT. Rssou CEs J. 77, 85-86 (2003). Disincentives to install IGCC technology lie in its
high costs. NSR, Title IV's allocation of extra allowances to existing coal-fired plants, and
the availability of cheap western low-sulfur coal have thus far combined to create an entry
barrier to IGCC and other clean coal technologies.
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b. The Increasing Popularity of Coasean Solutions to Environmental
Problems in the United States
Although the general superiority of price-based systems is
recognized in academia, 87 they have rarely been used in the United
States. For example, liability rules have only been used during
implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 19908
and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA) of 1980, the portion of CERCLA known as "Superfund." 89
In comparison, Coasean solutions have been greatly used over time.
Since the mid-1980s, the EPA has implemented an internal
emissions trading policy-bubbles, netting, offsets, and banking.90 For
example, the EPA utilized a trading mechanism to phase out the lead
87. See Wiener, supra note 64, at 682 (observing that "the [prevailing] presumption
[within academic circles] is that, among the incentive instruments, the price-based tax and
liability rule instruments.. .wil typically be superior to the quantity-based tradeable
allowance and property rule instruments....").
88. The Oil Pollution Act imposes strict liability on dischargers and requires damage
awards to include "natural resource" damages. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (1990)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2000)). The inclusion of natural resource damages is
intended to provide an incentive for owners of oil tankers to make efforts to prevent or
minimize oil spills in the first place.
89. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019622 (2000)). The CERCLA imposes strict and joint and several liability on "potential
responsible parties," which include former and current owners or operators of Superfund
sites, and contractors and transporters of hazardous substances who were involved in the
supply chain for ultimate disposal or treatment. Potential responsible parties are liable for
all relevant costs, such as remediation costs, natural resource damages, and health
assessment costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
90. See generally U.S. EPA, Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for
Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (Dec. 4,
1986) [hereinafter 1986 EPA Emissions Trading Policy]. Netting is an internal trading
mechanism in which increased emissions in one point are used to offset decreased
emissions in other points as long as it is expected that there is no net increase in emissions
within the entire plant (facility). Bubble is a very similar mechanism because all individual
emission sources under the control of the same person are regarded as a single source for
regulatory purposes, as if the total emissions combined were coming from a single
imaginary outlet in the bubble. The bubble is what makes netting legal in the first place;
but it is different in that it is used by existing sources to pursue flexibility in complying
with pollution control requirements, and the use of bubbles is limited by the regulatory
definition of a source. Netting is used in the NSR context to forego preconstruction review,
allowing the source to make a physical or operational change without obtaining a permit.
See Reitze, supra note 59, at 1622-25. Offsets are used to cover increased emissions from new
or significantly modified major stationary sources in nonattainment areas. 42 U.S.C. §
7503(c). Offsets, also called emissions reduction credits (ERCs), can be obtained from
banked allowances. Emission reductions may be banked if they are surplus, enforceable,
permanent, and quantifiable, and may be deposited in state-managed banks whose rules
must be approved by the EPA. See 1986 EPA Emissions Trading Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. at
43831,43841,43849.
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content of gasoline during the mid-1980s. 91 The 1990 CAA Amendments
created the S02 allowance trading program covering the electric power
sector. Since then, some electric power plants and large industrial boilers
in eastern states subject to the EPA's 1998 NOx SIP call have begun to
92
participate in the Agency's NOx Budget Trading Program (NBP).
At the state level, California and other opt-in states allow
covered automobile manufacturers to trade NOx and VOC emission
credits with another manufacturer or to bank them for future use under
their low emission vehicle (LEV) program.93 The South Coast Air Quality
Management District's (SCAQMD) Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM) program provides for NOx and SO 2 emissions trading
between covered stationary sources. 94
Other examples of the use of Coasean approaches to solving
environmental problems include effluent trading95 and wetlands
mitigation banking96 under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In a broader
91. Under the program, refineries were allowed to trade and bank creditable lead
rights between and among themselves. The amount of credits was determined by pooling
leaded gasoline and unleaded gasoline produced in relation to the allowable lead content
under the then-existing fuel and fuel additive standard. This was terminated in 1986. See 40
C.F.R. § 80.20 (1988); U.S. EPA, Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322
(Oct. 29, 1982); Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives: Gasoline Lead Content, 50 Fed. Reg.
9386 (Mar. 7, 1985); Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, Banking of Lead Rights, 50
Fed. Reg. 13,116 (Apr. 2, 1985).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (SO 2); 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (NOx). See also supra text
accompanying note 27.
93. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1960.1(g)(2),(b) (2004).
94. The South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XX-Rules 20002020.
95. Effluent trading takes place between sources sharing the same watershed: (1) intraplant trading, (2) pretreatment trading, (3) point-point trading, (4) point-nonpoint trading,
and (5) nonpoint-nonpoint trading. Intra-plant trading is a bubble in the context of water
quality management. Pretreatment trading is a variant of early reduction credits in that
indirect dischargers obtain extra credits by agreeing to comply with more stringent
pretreatment standards implemented at publicly owned treatment works (POTWs). See
U.S. EPA, Effluent Trading in Watersheds Policy Statement, 61 Fed. Reg. 4994 (Feb. 9,
1996). Ineffectual nonpoint pollution control has placed a disproportionate economic
burden on industrial point sources. For the most part, effluent trading is aimed at
providing financial incentives for nonpoint sources to reduce their pollution, while
lessening compliance costs to be paid by point sources. Currently, implementation of
effluent trading is in a pilot phase. Effluent trading will not be implemented on a massive
scale, because, unlike air emissions, effluents have stronger localized effects (so-called "hot
spot" problems), and the geographical scope of any effluent trading program is severely
limited by locational and seasonal patterns of water currents.
96. Under the CWA, dredging or filling wetlands requires a permit from the Army
Corps of Engineers. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). Wetlands mitigation banking allows a
wetland developer to obtain the speedy regulatory approval of his or her wetland
development plan by requiring the purchase (or creation) of wetland credits in the market.
Usually, wetland developers are required to hold wetland credits that represent the size of

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

sense, the use of various techniques for land use control purposes, such
as transferable development rights (TDRs) and conservation easements,
can be classified as a Coasean solution; these policy tools are aimed at
creating a financial incentive for land owners to engage in sustainable
land management practices by offering a quid pro quo for accepting
restrictions on the exercise of their property rights.
C. The Reasons for the Underutilization of Pollution Taxes in the
United States
1. Lack of PoliticalCurrency
Political, rather than economic, reasons explain why pollution
taxes have been underutilized in the United States. Pollution taxes are
considered an additional burden by industry, because it cannot escape
reduction requirements under a pollution charge system unless it
completely reduces emissions. 97 Industry prefers technology-based
control systems that "impos[e] higher entry costs in the forms of
regulatory expenses on new plants and products." 98 Industry accepts the
idea of tradeable allowances more readily because it can influence
allocation decisions and perceives allowance trading as offering greater
flexibility.
In short, because "[tihe process of defining property rights
defines wealth and its distribution in society," 99 regulators, politicians,
and industry all have vested interests in perpetuating the current
regulatory system and resisting the short-term legal uncertainty,
instability, and related costs that may be caused by institutional
changes. 10 ° This is the best possible explanation why the use of
grandfathered tradeable permit systems is so prevalent in the United
States. Also, where substantial political capital has already been spent on
wetlands three times the amount of lost wetlands. This can be achieved by buying credits
in the market or by agreeing to implement wetland restoration projects somewhere else. See
J.B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law: A Case
Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 365, 368-72 (2001).
97. Reitze, supra note 59, at 1618-19; Adam Chase, The Efficiency Benefits of "Green
Taxes," 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 24 (1992); Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz
& Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REV. 313,348-51 (1998).
98. Chase, supra note 97, at 22-23. See also Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick,
A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. & ECON. 99, 105-06, 121-22
(1982) (explaining how uniform federal environmental regulation can raise rivals' costs and
"redistribute wealth among competing firms in [the same] industry").
99. Yandle, supra note 54, at 26.
100. Chase, supra note 97, at 21-23 (stating that "the United States' shortterm orientation
and political structure makes for a strong status quo bias").
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establishing a tradeable permit system, as in the case of the SO 2 Acid
Rain Program, it is highly unlikely that pollution taxes will replace such
a system.
Setting a tax rate at the socially optimal level is hardly an easy
task. It can be extremely difficult to come up with a politically acceptable
tax plan due to the difficulty of calculating the total social cost of
pollution, and because marginal abatement costs can be grossly uneven
among different firms, industries, and regions. 1°1 Under the American
administrative law system, "delegating authority to fix tax rates to EPA
or a similar state agency might lead to delay and uncertainty similar to
that experienced under traditional regulation." 10 2 Even if Congress sets
the tax rate, "because a political process fixes the tax rate, taxes do not
provide the escape from government decisions inspired by the free
market vision." 1°3 In order for pollution taxes to be effective, the tax rate
should be adjusted over time. Whereas frequent rate revisions may
"create uncertainties.. .that weaken a tax's ability to stimulate
innovation," stable tax rates over a long period of time do not provide
enough incentive to innovate and "may delay an appropriate response to
changing conditions and new information about environmental
effects."104
General American sentiments against tax increases or new taxes
come into play as well, because proportional taxes tend to be regressive.
Energy taxes in particular have faced fierce political opposition because
they are certain to cause uneven regional impacts due to vastly differing
energy structures and energy consumption patterns from region to
region. For example, northeastern states have opposed taxes that would
increase the price of heating oil during winter when consumption is the
highest. 105 Western states dislike increases in gasoline taxes because of
greater-than-average driving distances.1° 6 Corn-belt states have been
sensitive to diesel fuel price increases because of their heavy
consumption of diesel fuels for agricultural use.1°7 Energy-producing
states in the Midwest and the Southeast are generally hostile to the idea

101. Reitze, supra note 59, at 1621 (stating that "pollution control taxes raise questions of
fairness and distribution because they affect industries and geographic regions unevenly.
They tend to impact small businesses more harshly than large entities.").
102. Driesen, supra note 30, at 341.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 341-42.
105. Henry Lee, The Political Economy of Energy Taxes: An Assessment of the Opportunities
and Obstacles,12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 77, 84 (1994).
106. Id. at 84, 86.
107. Id. at 84.
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of energy taxes because of the expectation that energy-intensive local
108
industries will be hardest hit.
These variations are also present within the electricity sector.
The Pacific Northwest satisfies most of its electricity needs by relying on
hydroelectric power from local dams, which also supply electricity to the
Southwest. 10 9 The Northeast and the South have relatively low CO2
emissions, despite the fact that prevailing weather conditions require
heavy use of heating oil and electricity, respectively, because a great
share of the electricity used comes from nuclear power. u 0 On the other
hand, average per capita CO 2 emissions in the Midwest are higher than
those in any other region because the Midwest uses electricity generated
primarily by coal-fired power plants, which are concentrated in that
region."'
At this point, it is useful to briefly discuss the use of pollution
taxes in European countries, where the general public is more supportive
of pollution taxes than emissions trading. The following discussion
shows the difference between theory and practice in implementing
pollution taxes as well as an attitudinal change toward the use of
pollution taxes in Europe that illustrates the problems facing a pollution
tax system in today's globalized economy.
Some European countries have implemented green energy taxes
("eco-taxes") whose rates are set based on a fossil fuel's environmental
impact. For example, Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.) impose
an electricity consumption tax or levy that is assessed on a per kilowatt
(kWh) basis on electric utilities." 2 One of the environmental benefits of
this type of tax system is that cleaner, more energy-efficient electricity
generators gain a competitive advantage in the restructured national
electricity market. Scandinavian nations have enforced a carbon tax
system for over a decade. n 3 Some other nations, including Italy, have

108.
109.

Id.

RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 0203, THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF CARBON MITIGATION POLICIES 12 (Feb. 2002), at

http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-IB-02-03.pdf.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Joachim Schleich et al., Germany: Unification and Contradiction, in CLIMATE
CHANGE

AND

POWER:

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

FOR

EUROPEAN

ELECTRICITY 167-68

(Christiaan Vrolijk ed., 2002); Nocola Steen & Christiaan Vrolijk, United Kingdom: Power
Markets and Market Policies, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND POWER: ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY, id. 236-38.

113. See Richard A Westin, UnderstandingEnvironmental Taxes, 46 TAx LAW. 327, 34142
(1993).
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recently moved in this direction as part of their electricity restructuring
4
efforts."
Most of the pollution taxes now being implemented in Europe
are not ideally designed. Dominant electricity generators and some local
industries are frequently exempted from tax liability." 5 The fuel mix and
the economic structure of the electricity industry, as well as the pace and
shape of electricity restructuring in Europe, vary from country to
country~1 6 As in the United States, transmission bottlenecks, less-thanexpected competition in many of the national retail markets, and
ineffective policy coordination of transmission pricing rules at the EU
level have slowed the pace of establishing a healthy and competitive
regional electricity market. In this situation, many legal uncertainties
significantly affect the behavior of relevant stakeholders.
Despite the general tendency of Europeans to favor a tax
approach, most countries, with the exception of Italy, are now reluctant
to enact a progressive carbon tax system or eco-taxes.1 7 The short
answer is that economic integration in general and the transition to
electricity restructuring taking place within the European Union have an
adverse effect on EU member nations' attitude toward environmental
114. Since 1999, Italy has implemented carbon taxes. Marcella Pavan, Italy: Climate
Change Policy and Electricity Liberalization, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND POWER: EcoNoMIc
INSTRUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY, supranote 112, at 185-87. France also plans to tax
carbon emissions beginning in 2010. Christophe de Gouvello, France: Focus on Non-Fossil
Fuels, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND POWER: ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN
ELECTRICITY, supra note 112, at 140-42.
115. For example, Sweden excludes coal from taxable fuels to protect the economic
interests of coal-fired power plants and exempts electricity use from the program's
coverage; fuel consumption in industry is entitled to a 65% tax rate reduction. See Thomas
Sterner & Gunnar Kohlin, Environmental Taxes in Europe, 1 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 117, 132
(2003), available at Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection,
http://ssm.com/abstract=461537 (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
116. Denmark derives more than half of its electricity from coal-fired power plants.
Poul Erik Grohnheit, Demark: Long-term Planning with Different Objectives, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND POWER: ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY, supra note 112,
at 108, fig. 6.1. Germany has a relatively large and politically powerful coal industry.
Scandinavian countries have abundant sources of hydropower. In France, the share of
nuclear power in electricity generation is nearly 75 percent, while only ten percent of
electricity generation comes from fossil fuel combustion. de Gouvello, supra note 114, at
134, fig. 7.1. Recently, its former electricity monopoly, Electricit6 de France (EdF), has
aggressively pursued mergers with and acquisitions of energy companies in neighboring
countries. See, e.g., Michael Albers, European Union Law: Energy Liberalization and EC
Competition Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 909, 922-26 (2002).
117. The Italian carbon tax system does not permit any tax exemptions. Preferential tax
rates apply to industrial self-generators and cogenerators. To amplify a double dividend
effect, the tax revenues collected are used to reduce other tax burdens, primarily labor taxes
and heating fuel costs, and to support investments in projects and activities that are aimed
at GHG emission reductions. See Pavan, supra note 114.
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taxes. The aforementioned problems have combined to create a situation
in which many European countries are unwilling to enact a carbon tax or
any other pollution taxes of a progressive nature due to their concerns
about the impact of such taxes on electricity prices and the
competitiveness of energy-intensive local industries and dominant
domestic electric utilities.
Political support for pollution taxes, especially a carbon tax, has
eroded worldwide, as many public sectors previously subject to
extensive government regulation are transitioning to free competition in
today's globalized economy. Given the different economic structures and
energy use patterns among nations, the process of globalization makes a
pollution tax system less politically appealing. Without concerted
international efforts to implement pollution taxes, the future of pollution
taxes will be bleak.
2. Major Types of Energy Taxes
There are three types of energy taxes: (1) the ad valorem tax, (2)
the BTU tax, and (3) the carbon tax. 118 An ad valorem tax is assessed
"based on a percentage of a fuel's sales price"; 119 gasoline taxes belong in
this category. An ad valorem tax promotes coal use and is the most
discouraging to the development of renewable energy. Additionally, an
ad valorem tax has the greatest income effect on the general public
because of its cost sensitivity and regressivity. The BTU tax is calculated
based on the heat input of a fuel. It penalizes more efficient energy
technologies because "the more heat one could extract per unit of fuel,
the greater the amount of tax that would be incurred." 120 The carbon tax
is calculated based on the carbon content of fuels. Thus, it is relatively
easy to administer compared with the ad valorem method and the BTU
tax.
Among the three types of taxes, the carbon tax is most effective
for addressing climate change concerns and promoting sustainable
patterns of energy production and consumption because it "place[s] a
disincentive on dirty fuel consumption" and stimulates energy
conservation and the use of clean fuels. 121 The winners are nuclear power
and renewable energy sources. Thus, a carbon tax system should be the
choice if the nation chooses to use a tax approach under its climate
change policy. Given that most renewable energy sources do not emit
118. Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax: The Introduction of the Carbon-Burned Tax
(CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 221, 229 (1992).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 231-32.
121. Id. at 232.
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CO 2 and other GHGs, a carbon tax will facilitate the development of

renewable energy technologies. If some of the revenues are used to
finance renewable energy projects, the tax's positive effects will be
further magnified.
The Midwest and other coal-producing areas will be hardest hit
by the imposition of a carbon tax. Midwestern and southeastern coalfired utilities would have to increase their rates to shift some of the tax
burden to consumers, or they would have to absorb the tax burden
themselves due to intense competition in the market. 122 Hence, higher
electricity prices, production curtailments, or plant shutdowns would
result. In either case, the carbon tax system would induce reduced coal
consumption and increased use of cleaner fuels.
Resistance from energy-producing states, including midwestern
states, will be a significant barrier to the enactment of a carbon tax in the
United States. This observation is based on historical experience; a BTU
tax proposal by the Clinton administration failed to garner enough
support for its passage in Congress, despite the fact that a BTU tax is
assessed based on energy input and, hence, is much more acceptable to
the coal and utility industries than a carbon tax. 123 The tax failed to pass
in Congress because a broad-based BTU tax plan, as initially proposed
by the administration, was considered by virtually every industry to
carry additional burdens; concessions and compromises made during
congressional deliberations ultimately led to collapse. 124
According to one study, a carbon tax or a CO2 emissions trading
system would impose significantly different burdens on households in
different regions unless wealth distributional impacts are dealt with
properly. 125 For example, average electricity prices would differ among
regions by the order of two due to regional variations in CO 2
emissions. 126 Therefore, in order to gain public support, it is imperative
that any proposed pollution tax have the broadest base as possible and
be instituted as a part of a larger tax reform effort to be revenue-

122. Id. at 242.
123. For a detailed discussion of political battles leading up to the abandonment of the
BTU tax proposal, see generally Dawn Erlandson, The Btu Tax Experience: What Happened
and Why It Happened, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 173 (1994).
124. Id. at 176-84.
125. MORGENSTERN ET AL., supra note 109, at 12 (citing William Pizer, James N.
Sanchirico & Michael Batz, Regional Patterns of Household Energy Use and Carbon Emissions
(paper presented at Resources for the Future Workshop, The Distributional Impacts of
Carbon Mitigation Policies, Dec. 11, 2001)).
126. Id. at 20, fig. 2. For annual CO2 emissions per household, see also id. at 12. For
annual CO 2 emissions per household, see also id. at 20, fig. 2.
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neutral. 127 Again, these efforts are certain to be subject to cumbersome
political processes, which, along with other factors, may explain why
property-based tradeable permit systems rather than pollution taxes
have been used in the United States.
3. The Comparative Advantages of Emissions Trading in the Context of Climate
Change
Emissions trading has several advantages over a carbon tax.
First, the emissions cap can be more easily established using such
benchmarks as the Kyoto Protocol's seven-percent reduction target or
the UNFCCC's GHG emissions stabilization goal. Given that a specific
national commitment under international law is usually a precondition
for domestic implementation of climate change mitigation policy, "the
certainty about the size of the emissions reductions" would make
emissions trading preferable to the carbon tax system.128 Different cost
curves among various industrial sectors might produce political
wrangling over applicable tax rates, even when reliable cost figures are
readily available.
Furthermore, emissions trading has an additional advantage
over a carbon tax: the grandfathering of CO2 emissions allowances.
While it can achieve the same result through tax ceilings or credits, rate
adjustments, or rebates, a carbon tax with such features would become
too complex to administer or would create too many loopholes,
compromising the tax's underlying environmental goals. Finally, CO 2
emissions trading can build on the nation's prior experience with
tradeable permit systems.
4. Similaritiesbetween Pollution Taxes and Emissions Trading
The above discussion might indicate that pollution taxes are a
different creature from emissions trading. But they could become
comparable, depending on chosen design features and allocation
methods, or the two systems could be combined in a manner that
maximizes economic efficiency. If a pollution tax is designed to allow tax
exemptions for the portion of emissions below a certain threshold level,
it becomes similar to a grandfathered tradeable permit system. If
127. According to a poll conducted in 1998, over 70 percent of the people surveyed
responded that they would support a revenue-neutral tax bill for reducing fossil fuel
consumption. Lamont C. Hempel, Climate Policy on the Installment Plan, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 299 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2000) (citing a poll conducted by
International Communications Research for Friends of the Earth).
128. A. Myrick Freeman III, Economics, Incentives, and Environmental Regulation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 127, at 204-05.
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allowances are allocated by means of auctioning, a tradeable allowance
system becomes identical to a pollution tax.
Moreover, if auction revenue is recycled to neutralize unequal
wealth distribution effects, a tradeable allowance system can have the
same "double dividend" effect as the revenue-neutral pollution taxes. In
a combined system with tax credits applied to a certain minimum
amount of pollution, firms can choose between either of the options:
paying the full tax or purchasing emissions reduction credits in the
trading market, depending on the different cost curve of pollution
abatement facing each firm. 129
5. Incentive-BasedApproaches as an Additional Layer of Preexisting
Technology-Based Command-and-ControlRegulation
Economists generally have a hidden bias for market-based
approaches because they tend to think that these approaches entail less
cost than "command-and-control" regulation. However, this perception
does not give significant weight to the fact that the success of marketbased approaches hinges on highly-sophisticated monitoring capacity
and a threat of enforcement strong enough to prevent regulated firms
from cheating on their performance. In some cases, the reliable
monitoring of some pollutant emissions may not be available because
installation and operating costs of the monitoring equipment could be
prohibitively high, or because the chemical nature of a regulated
pollutant precludes reliable monitoring. For instance, the operation of
the continuous emissions monitoring system (CEMS) as required under
the CAA's SO 2 Acid Rain Program involves huge costs relating to the
installation and operating of such a system.
Professor David Driesen has consistently argued that emissions
trading does not constitute a better alternative to command-and-control
regulation. In his view, "[emissions] trading reduces the incentive for
high-cost sources to apply new [pollution control] technology," while
providing some incentive for low-cost sources to reduce their emissions
beyond required levels.130 Further, Driesen argues, the overall effects of
emissions trading on technological innovation may be negative because
high-cost sources may not have to make substantial innovation to
achieve facility-specific emission reductions as may be required under a
comparable technology-based regulation.13 '

129. Chase, supra note 97, at 31-32.
130. See David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit
Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting,31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 519 (2004).
131. See, e.g., id. at 519-20.
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In a law review article published in 1985, Professor Howard
Latin argued against economic incentive-based systems, stating that
instrument choice in environmental regulation must be tailored to
particularized circumstances and must be more flexible and attuned to
taking into account the costs and benefits of the selected policy tool.
Latin observed that such "fine-tuning" would be impracticable in many
cases because "theoretically 'efficient' regulatory strategies require more
data, more sophisticated scientific and economic analyses, more agency
expertise and resources, and more cooperation from regulated
parties." 132 According to Latin, the dominance of uniform regulatory
standards can be explained by "inherent limitations on environmental
decision making and from conflicts between the legitimate but
incompatible interests of diverse parties." 133 Professor Latin argued that
there is no guarantee that the implementation limitations inherent in
environmental policy-making would be resolved under a new regulatory
134
paradigm advocated by critics of command-and-control regulation.
Rather, regulatory fine-tuning would "increase decisionmaking costs,
and opportunities for
delays, inconsistencies, bureaucratic discretion,
135
manipulative behavior by regulated parties."
It is important to note that, with the exception of the SCAQMD's
RECLAIM, market-based programs have never been substitutes for
command-and-control in the United States. Rather, these programs
represent an additional layer of preexisting technology-based
regulations, capitalizing on prior regulatory work and experiences.
Based on prior experience with pollution trading programs, the viability
and effectiveness of a market-based solution in the United States depend
on the following factors: the numbers of regulated sources; the physical
and chemical nature of a regulated pollutant; the range of technology
options available; the existence of a cost-effective monitoring, reporting
and verification system; adaptive decision-making processes; and so
forth.
The failure of the SCAQMD's RECLAIM, and other related
programs, typifies this point. The RECLAIM program was implemented
as a substitute for command-and-control. Its early implementation had
the effect of relaxing then-existing technology-based standards by
allocating allowances based on allowable, rather than actual,

132. Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standardsand "Fine-Tuning"Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1304 (1985).
133. Id. at 1331.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1331-32.
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emissions. 136 Because of the inclusion of relatively large numbers of small
sources, monitoring requirements have not been effectively enforced. 137
Further, the SCAQMD has failed to establish a reporting and verification
system that allows cost-effective, efficient real-time checking on
submitted information, thereby making timely regulatory responses
possible 38 and providing regulated firms disincentive to violate. 139 The
trading of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) emissions between
refineries and car scrappers has been ineffective in curbing ozone
pollution, because increased VOC emissions from refineries have created
local toxic hot spots, and because of faulty assumptions on the amount of
avoided mobile source emissions and alleged car scrappers' gaming of
the system. 40
136. See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XX-Rule 2002(c).
California suffered from an economic downturn during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
The SCAQMD faced enormous political pressure from in-state industry stakeholders who
were critical of traditional source-specific technology-based standards that were applied to
them with ever-increasing stringency. Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and
Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVrL. L.
& POL'Y F. 231, 245 (1999). As a result of RECLAIM, the vast majority of sources had little
difficulty complying with their permit conditions with no discernible environmental
benefits, and, hence, the trading market was underutilized until after the energy crisis in
2000 and 2001 hit the state of California. See U.S. EPA, AN EVALUATION OF THE SOUTH
COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIsmIcT's REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET-

LESSONs IN ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS AND INNOVATION 12 (Nov. 2002) [hereinafter
EVALUATION OF SCAQMD CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET].
137. The EPA found that monitoring requirements are more burdensome on smaller
sources; the EPA also noted environmentalists' belief that emission factors are more heavily
used than necessary. EVALUATION OF SCAQMD CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET, supranote
136, at 35. Note that RECLAIM covers existing and new stationary sources with more than
"four" tons of annual NOx or SO 2 emissions, unless these sources are not subject to permit
requirements or are exempted emission sources. SCAQMD, Regulation XX-Rule
2001(c)(1)(C).
138. EVALUATION OF SCAQMD CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET, supra note 136, at 31-32.
As the EPA indicated, over-allocations of emissions reduction credits raised fewer, if any,
enforcement problems in the early years of RECLAIM. Id. at 32. Many facilities were slow
to comply with monitoring and reporting requirements. Drury et al., supra note 136, at 28081.
[Aln audit of the RECLAIM program found that industry has been slow to
comply with the [CEMS] requirements. After the first year, 30 percent of
the RECLAIM facilities had not installed properly operating CEM[S].
Although most CEMs are now certified, electronic data reporting
requirements were still being violated forty percent of the time by major
sources, and eighty percent of the time by small sources.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
139. EVALUATION OF SCAQMD CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET, supra note 136, at 32-33
(noting that RECLAIM lacked a penalty structure with an adequate deterrence effect because electric
utilities might be able to compensate for assessed penalties through increased electricity sales).
140. Drury et al., supra note 136, at 259-62. VOC emissions are outside of the scope of
the program. It is important to note, however, that VOC emissions are covered under a
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As Professor Latin indicated, implementation of an incentivebased program is not easy unless all of the preconditions for its success
are satisfied. The real explanation for the increasing popularity of
market-based emissions controls might be that technology-based
command-and-control has reached its full potential; its rigidity,
inflexibility, and other inefficiencies make a timely response to changing
information and needs unlikely. 41 One such indicator is found in the fact
that some prominent environmental groups are now avid supporters of
emissions trading and other market-based mechanisms. Environmentalists generally oppose the free market vision of solving environmental
problems because they believe environmental pollution is the result of
market failures that necessitate governmental intervention in the first
place, and that market-based approaches embody the notion of a
property right to pollute. However, in the face of mounting criticisms
environmental
command-and-control
technology-based,
against
regulations, some environmental groups have begun to embrace marketdifferent inter-source pollution trading program. Under the SCAQMD's Mobile Source
Offset Programs, stationary sources can forego some of the on-site emissions reductions
that are otherwise required under applicable technology-based regulations by purchasing
emission reduction credits from qualifying mobile sources. The programs encourage
scrapping of old, high-pollution vehicles; the voluntary repair of on-road motor vehicles;
the purchase of clean on-road or off-road vehicles; the electrification of truck stops and tour
bus stops to reduce vehicle emissions by engine idling; the purchase of clean lawn and
garden equipment; and other pilot credit-generation programs. The South Coast Air
Quality Management District, Regulation XVI-Mobile Source Offset Programs, Rules
1605, 1610, 1612, 1612.1, 1613, 1620, 1623, 1631-34. Because motor vehicles are major
sources of VOC emissions, most of the credit transactions have involved VOCs. The four
large oil refining companies, Chevron, GATX, Ultramar, and Unocal, have reportedly been
the major beneficiaries of the trading program. The program has been heavily criticized by
California-based environmental groups for creating toxic hot spots in ethnic minority
communities. The source of the problem is that the majority of oil refineries are located in
neighborhoods in which minorities and other economically disadvantaged people live.
Because the toxicity and reactivity of VOCs released from oil refineries may be greater than
those from motor vehicles, mobile source offset trading allegedly has exposed minority
groups to increased environmental hazards and related health risks while not helping
reduce smog formation. The trading of emission reduction credits that pretend to be
between the same kind of pollutants in fact has been "inter-pollutant" trading. See Drury et
al., supra note 136, at 252, 255-57.
141. One of the strengths of any cap-and-trade program versus traditional technologybased command-and-control is its flexibility. A regulated firm is allowed to choose any mix
of compliance options to meet its reduction target. The program's performance instead is
guaranteed by imposing on all covered sources the emissions caps and stringent
monitoring and penalty requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(a)(1)(B) (2000). Under Phase II
of the S02 Acid Rain Program, the same emissions limit of 1.2 lbs/mm Btu has been
applied across the board. Thus, S02 allowance trading has had the effect of addressing
grandfathering to some extent, which had traditionally been the source of the problem of
the ineffectual workings of the CAA's NSPS and NSR programs.
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based programs as politically acceptable alternatives to command-andcontrol, which can result in continuous improvements in environmental
quality by imposing more stringent pollution reduction requirements on
grandfathered industrial sources at regular intervals.
II. CO 2 (GHG) EMISSIONS TRADING OR A CARBON TAX
A. Suitability and Feasibility
Emissions trading or pollution taxes can work well in the context
of global climate change. Sources of CO 2 emissions are ubiquitous.
Because of significant cost variations, trading between both high- and
low-cost sources presents a real opportunity to maximize efficiency
gains. Fortunately, there is no significant problem with monitoring
carbon emissions because the carbon content of a fossil fuel can be used
as a proxy for expensive real-time monitoring. These and other factors
clearly indicate that flexibility mechanisms should be employed as a
viable policy tool to achieve a carbon reduction goal in a cost-effective
manner.
The fact that carbon capture and sequestration are not yet
commercially viable confirms the need for pursuing sustainable energy
development: promoting energy conservation and efficiency, and the
development and commercial deployment of cleaner, more efficient
energy sources and technologies. Future climate change law will help to
achieve these goals in a way that current U.S. environmental and energy
law have not. These goals are achievable because effective carbon control
policy will raise fuel prices and, thus, increase the economic value of
energy efficiency and conservation. As a consequence, entry barriers to
clean energy technologies will be cleared and technological innovation
will be spurred by the elimination of implicit subsidies for existing dirty
sources. The key to success is strong political leadership with the
wisdom and courage to tell the truth to and persuade the American
public about the need for prompt action on climate change.
B. The Benefits of a Comprehensive Approach
As noted above, there are relatively few problems with the
calculations of CO 2 emissions; fossil fuel inputs to the economy can be
used as a proxy for the direct measurement of CO 2 emissions. Currently,
real-time monitoring is economically feasible only for large utility and
industrial boilers, including those already subject to the CEMS
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142
requirement under the existing SO 2 and NOx trading programs. NonCO 2 GHG emissions, on the other hand, raise monitoring and
verification problems because many of these emissions are of a diffuse or
fugitive nature.
However, the C0 2-only policy exempting other GHGs from
reduction requirements does not take full advantage of all the
environmental and economic benefits that the comprehensive approach
covering all GHGs can offer. First, the exclusive focus on carbon
emissions control ignores the lifecycle effects of GHG emissions: reduced
CO 2 emissions from a greater use of cleaner fuels can create a leakage
problem. Other GHGs are generally more potent global warming gages
than CO2.143 Therefore, if unaddressed, a shift to other activities that
generate non-C02 emissions could negate CO 2 reduction benefits outside
the trading program.144 For example, increased natural gas production
can lead to increased emissions of methane (CH 4) due to the
mismanagement of gas pipeline systems. 145 With relatively small net
benefits from their use,146 increased reliance on biomass-based renewable

142. CAROLYN FISCHER ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, CLIMATE ISSUE BRIEF No.10,
USING EMISSIONS TRADING TO REGULATE U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: BASIC POLICY
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 6 (1998), at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-

CCIB-10.pdf.
143. There are six principal GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO 2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide
(N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6).
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 3, Annex A. GHGs "vary in their instantaneous radiative forcing
(heat-trapping) ability, reactivity, and residence time in the atmosphere." Richard B.
Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of
Design and Practicability,9 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 86 (1992). Each GHG's radiative
forcing ability is compared to that of C02 and presented as its global warming potential
(GWP). GWP therefore expresses the relative ability of one unit of a GHG to affect climate
change over a given period of time, considering both direct and indirect effects. For the
GWP of each of the non-CO2 GHGs, see Radiative Forcing of Climate Change, in
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) WORKING GROUP I, IPCC THIRD
ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, ch. 6, pt. 12, subpt. 2 (2001), available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc4-tar/wg1/248.htm; see also DirectGWPs, id. tbl. 6.7.
144. Stewart & Wiener, supra note 143, at 91.
145. Id. at 91-92.
146. Ethanol production involves heavy fossil fuel inputs that are used to ferment and
distill corn. Thus, increased use of ethanol does not necessarily reduce fossil fuel usage.
Furthermore, ethanol use during summer months increases VOC emissions because it
tends to increase the volatility of reformulated gasoline, thus resulting in energy loss as
well. See Editorial, The Wrong War, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2003; David L. Greene & Andreas
Schafer, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissionsfrom U.S. Transportation,at 30, box 7 (Report for
the Pew Center on Climate Change, May 2003), at http://www.pewclimate.org/doc
Uploads/ustransp%2Epdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2005); RErZE, supra note 2, at 346. Methyl
tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) does not help reduce GHG emissions "[blecause of energy
losses in converting natural gas, and the carbon content of MTBE itself." Green & Schafer,
supra, at 30.
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fuels, such as corn-based ethanol and other dedicated energy crops, can
generate more nitrous oxide (N 20) emissions if such crops are grown
with the heavy use of fertilizers, and the absorptive capacity of sinks can
be reduced if the massive cultivation of biomass crops displaces forest
147
lands.
Although reliable cost analyses of reductions of non-C02 GHG
emissions are not currently available, their close relationships to CO2
emissions in industrial production processes or mobile source
emissions 148 and their greater global warming potential (GWP)149 suggest
that the comprehensive approach could provide greater incentives for
industry to explore a cost-effective way of improving energy efficiency
or recycling waste energy. Since monitoring technologies and technology
for capturing CH 4 emissions from large landfills already exist,15°
recycling of CH 4 emissions can reduce the amount of natural gas used as
a heating fuel during winter.151 The fact that N20 emissions from
industrial sources are difficult to control does not necessarily mean that
they should be excluded from reduction requirements. Due to the
relatively small number of major stationary sources of NOx emissions,
such as electric utilities and large industrial boiler units, inclusion of
these sources could facilitate the development of monitoring and
52
combustion control technology.
With regard to other non-point sources, such as agricultural
activities and carbon sinks, for which there is no known scientific
147. Stewart & Wiener, supra note 143, at 92.
148. Reduced C02 emissions from stationary sources can decrease N20 emissions
during fossil fuel combustion. More energy-efficient electricity generation can reduce
emissions of SF 6, which is an ozone-depleting substance with the highest GWP that is used
in electrical switchgear. John M. Reilly et al., Multi-Gas Contributors to Global Climate Change:
Climate Impacts and Mitigation Costs of Non-CO2 Gases 28 (prepared for the Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, Feb. 2003), at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Multi
%2DGas%2Epdf. This is also true of N 20 emissions caused by mobile sources.
149. Therefore, the amount of carbon equivalent assigned to other GHGs is greater than
that of CO 2 on a per-ton basis, which means that even a low permit price or tax rate per ton
of carbon equivalent for non-C02 GHG emissions provides a large incentive for reduction
efforts. See Reilly et al., supra note 148, at 32. However, the caveat is that if marginal cost
curves are steeper than those for CO 2, efficiency gains from the reduction of an additional
unit of non-CO2 GHGs would disappear quickly after relatively cheap control options are
exhausted at earlier stages. See id.
150. Id. at 34.
151. The state of Missouri is implementing a landfill gas recovery project under which it
provides a loan to the local high school using methane gases captured in the nearby landfill
as a heating fuel. See Pew Center on Climate Change, Climate ChangeActivities in the United
States: 2004 Update 16 (2004), at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/74241%5
FUS%20Activities%2OReport%5F040604%5F075445%2Epdf [hereinafter Climate Change
Activities].
152. Reilly et al., supranote 148, at 34.
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method for measurement, government should encourage sustainable
management practices using other regulatory means, including
15 3
Where
education, financial assistance, and conservation programs.
a
nation's
toward
applied
are
sources
emissions removals from these
commitment to GHG reductions under the Kyoto Protocol or the sources
are entitled to obtain reduction credits under a future domestic cap-andtrade program, conservative accounting methods should be applied to
4
take into consideration any scientific uncertainty involved.15 This in turn
will offer a powerful incentive for the pursuit of sustainable land-use
practices. In short, under the comprehensive approach, climate change
policy should comprise the right mix of policy tools and instruments.
The right mix will be that which best suits individual circumstances and
provides maximum flexibility in compliance depending on the number
of covered sources and the economic and technological feasibility of
available compliance options.

153. Vermont is operating a project that is aimed at promoting CH4 recovery from dairy
manure. Wisconsin has a similar program. The North Carolina State University Animal
and Poultry Waste Management Center is studying hog waste management technologies
that can be used to recover and recycle CI-H
4 emissions. See Climate Change Activities, supra
note 151, at 17. Georgia has promoted "no-tillage" farming practices by leasing no-till
equipment to farmers. See id. at 12. Oregon is by far the nation's leader in supporting
carbon sequestration projects as a way of facilitating sustainable forest management. Its
siting law addresses C02 emissions from power plants by requiring utilities to reduce
emissions by employing state-of-the-art electricity generation technologies or to fund or
contribute to renewable energy projects or reforestation projects. The Oregon Climate Trust
funds both domestic (in-state and out-of-state) and foreign reforestation projects that are
chosen in a competitive bidding process. See Barry G. Rabe, Greenhouse & Statehouse: The
Evolving State Government Role in Climate Change 30-31 (Policy Report prepared for Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, Nov. 2002), at http://www.pewclimate.org/doc
Uploads/states%5Fgreenhouse%2E-pdf; see also infra text accompanying note 311. The
Oregon Forest Resource Trust provides financial assistance to landowners in order to give
them incentives to "maintain healthy forests on under-producing forest lands."
Landowners assume "responsibility for managing the reforestation project based on an
agreed-on project plan" and "forego ownership of any carbon offset credits to the Trust,"
while they can recover up to one hundred percent of the costs incurred and share some of
the revenues from timber sales. See Climate Change Activities, supra note 151, at 12.
154. Stewart & Wiener, supra note 143, at 102.

Fall 2005]

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

C. An Examination of Design Issues of CO2 (GHG) Emissions Trading
or the Carbon Tax System with an Analysis of the Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 and the EU Emissions Trading Directive
1. Downstream or Upstream?
a. The Need for an Upstream Approach
One of the most important design issues is whether a cap-andtrade program or a carbon tax system should be structured as upstream
or downstream, or as a combination of both. From a theoretical
standpoint, an upstream cap-and-trade program (or its equivalent
carbon tax system) that attempts to control CO 2 emissions at upper
points entering into the economy, such as mine mouths, refineries, and
natural gas pipelines, is most ideal for two reasons. First, an upstream
program would be most effective in reducing GHG emissions because
the program is expected to have economy-wide impacts. 155 In other
words, industry would have to pass some of the increased costs of raw
materials (or production factors) onto consumers. Therefore, it is highly
likely that both producers and consumers would respond to changed
price signals by turning to green products or clean energy technologies.
Second, since permit allocations (or tax assessments) can be
made based on the carbon content of a fossil fuel (and the GWP of each
of the non-CO 2 GHGs),'56 an upstream program would involve low
administrative costs relative to other approaches. Government can easily
monitor and verify GHG emissions by keeping track of fossil fuel inputs
to the economy. Thus, given the large number of GHG emission sources
and the infeasibility of imposing the requirement for continuous
monitoring on all sources, an upstream program can significantly reduce
administrative costs associated with monitoring, reporting, and
verification.
On the other hand, a downstream approach is not a viable
option because it is almost impossible to administer, given the sheer
number of regulated sources. 157 Despite its superiority over a
downstream approach, the overriding concern is that an upstream
approach would face stronger political opposition than other
approaches, because it could significantly reduce consumer surplus and

155. Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Designing a Mandatory Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Program for the U.S., at iv (Prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, May 2003), at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/USGas%2Epdf.
156. Id. at iii.
157. Id.
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hurt the competitiveness of U.S. industry by "driv[ing] up the costs of
[fossil fuels]." 158
Morgenstem et al. analyzed the short-term economic impact of
two different CO 2 reduction policies on 361 manufacturing industries: (1)
an economy-wide policy such as a carbon tax or an upstream cap-andtrade program, and (2) a downstream policy covering the electricity
industry only. 159 Running linear input-out modeling based on an
extensive database of direct carbon use in the 361 manufacturing
industries, 16° Morgenstern estimated short-term commodity price
increases and both percentage and total production cost increases in
response to a one-dollar increase in the price of a carbon permit (or a
carbon tax rate) on a per-ton basis.'61
The essence of Morgenstern's findings was that cost impact
would be quite uneven from industry to industry because of significant
variations in production factors (energy inputs). Under an economywide program, price changes vary by two orders of magnitude among
361 manufacturing industries.162 The top eight hardest-hit industries
would bear more than one-half of the total burden when measured as the
cumulative percentage of total cost.163
The cost impact analysis of the electricity-only policy looked into
increases in electricity prices as well as those in intermediary product
prices caused by electricity price increases. 164 The result was that the
effects of the economy-wide and electricity-only policies on
manufacturing industries would be substantially different. Nine of the
ten hardest-hit industries ranked lower under the economy-wide policy
than under the electricity-only policy. 165 Eight of the ten hardest-hit
industries under the economy-wide policy ranked lower under the
158.

Id.

159. RICHARD D. MORGENSTERN ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DIscUSSION PAPER
No. 02-06, NEAR TERM IMPACTs OF CARBON MITIGATION POLICIES ON MANUFACTURING

INDusTRIEs 3 (Mar. 2002), at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-02-06.pdf.
160. See id. at 3-10.
161. Id. at 10, 12. Morgenstem and other researchers calculated production costs, taking
into account costs relating to purchased electricity, direct combustion of fossil fuels, and
non-energy intermediate inputs. Id. at 10. However, the researchers did not consider how a
future cap-and-trade or carbon tax program would treat the use of chemical feedstocks in
emissions calculations. Id. at 10 n.11.
162. Id.at 11.
163. Id. at 15-16, tbl. 2 and 17, fig. 1. These industries include petroleum refineries,
products of petroleum and coal, lubricating oils and greases, carbon black, asphalt paving
mixtures and blocks, lime, nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers, and asphalt felts and
coatings. They make heavy use of petroleum as an intermediate raw material. Id. at 12, tbl.
1.
164. Id. at 21.
165. See id. at 22, tbl. 4.
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electricity-only policy. Of these, the ranking of each of the five industries
(petroleum refineries, products of petroleum and coal, lubricating oils
and greases, asphalt paving mixtures and blocks, and asphalt felts and
coatings) was significantly lower; the other three industries ranked the
same (lime) or somewhat lower (carbon black, and nitrogenous and
phosphatic fertilizers). 166 The researchers considered only price changes,
but neither welfare impacts nor production factor substitution and
technological changes, which could take place in the long term in
167
response to cost changes.
The study by Morgenstern et al. at least confirmed that industry
has much at stake in how a future CO2 reduction policy is designed.
Unless expected uneven economic impact among industries is properly
addressed by policy makers, any policy proposal is certain to face
resistance from different industries depending on its design features.
Thus, a future upstream program should have the following
features designed to address this concern: phase-in requirements; an
allowance for early reduction credits; banking and borrowing, opt-in by
clean sources, and credits claimed for GHG reductions induced by landuse and forestry activities; exclusion of certain sources with high
compliance costs; "adjust[ments] for noncombustion uses of fossil fuel
inputs.. .such as chemical feedstocks"; 168 the grandfathering of some
portions of the total allowances; and revenue recycling via auctioning or
tax reform.
b. A "Large-Source" Downstream Approach and Its Variants
i. A pure large-source downstream approach
One variety of a downstream approach targets only major
stationary sources for which well-established regulatory programs are
already in place. 169 A four-pollutant bill, which would create a trading
program covering SO 2, NOx, mercury, and CO 2 emissions, represents
such an approach; it covers only the electric utility industry and some
large industrial boilers, the nation's largest sources of air emissions,

166. See id. The authors also compared the relative short- and long-term impacts of 21
industries sharing the same two-digit industry code. They concluded that short-term and
long-term impacts would be roughly the same at the two-digit industry code level. Id. at 24,
25, tbl. 5. But they pointed out that the weighted mean of percentage cost increases at the
two-digit code level hides big differences between four-digit industries within the same
two-digit industry. Id. at 26, 27, fig. 3.
167. Id. at 24.
168. FISCHER ET AL., supranote 142, at 6.
169. Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 155, at 21-22.
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including CO2 emissions. 170 The bill would be more politically acceptable
to the general public than an upstream program because it would not
171
cause price spikes in energy-related products other than electricity.
Four-pollutant trading has several advantages. The electric
utility industry and federal and state governments have been
accustomed to a cap-and-trade program. Ten years have passed since the
SO 2 Acid Rain Program became effective. The OTC NOx cap-and-trade
program has been implemented in northeastern states. 72 Under the 1998
NOx SIP call, the EPA-administered NOx cap-and-trade program
covering the eastern half of the nation took effect in the summer of
2004.173 Recently, the EPA published final interstate air quality rules that
would strengthen existing SO 2 and NOx reduction requirements and
bring mercury emissions from power plants under control. 174
The preexisting CEMS monitoring network and electronic
database systems can be used to implement CO 2 emissions trading
without imposing significant additional costs on regulated utilities.
Large industrial sources covered by the EPA's NBP have been in
compliance with the same requirements as those for electric utilities
under the SO 2 Acid Rain Program. The EPA operates "computerized
tracking systems to emissions data for SO2, NOx, and CO2 from electric
[utilities]."1 75 Additional CO2 and mercury controls present opportunities
to reduce emissions of other persistent air pollutants, including SO 2 and
NOx, in a cost-effective manner. 176 In short, four-pollutant trading is
expected to bring positive air quality benefits with minimum cost.
Some of the large industrial sources, for which a relatively
accurate GHG emissions inventory has been developed, can also be
covered under a cap-and-trade program (or an equivalent carbon tax

S. 556,107th Cong. (2001), and S. 366, H.R. 2042, 108th Cong. (2003).
Nordhaus & Danish, supranote 155, at iv.
See OZONE TRANSP. COMM'N, EPA-430-R-03-900, NOx BUDGET PROGRAM: 1999-2002
PROGRESS REPORT 5 (2003) [hereinafter OTC NOx TRADING REPORT FOR 1999-2002]; EPA
NBP REPORT FOR 2003, supra note 27, at 5.
173. See supra text accompanying note 27.
174. See id.
175. U.S. EPA, EPA-430-N-03-002, CLEAN AIR MARKETS UPDATE, Issue 4, Summer 2003,
at 10 [hereinafter CLEAN AIR MARKETS UPDATE].
170.
171.
172.

176. See, e.g., U.S. EIA, SR/OIAF/2001-05, ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING
MULTIPLE EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS WITH ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
SCENARIOS 77, tbl. 30 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/
eppats/pdf/sroiaf(2001)05.pdf (estimating that when implemented combined with
advanced energy efficiency measures, four-pollutant emissions trading legislation called
the Clean Power Act (S. 556), as proposed in 2001 by Senators Jim Jeffords and Joseph
Lieberman, would reduce net residential electricity bills per household by $42 per year in
2010 and $203 per year in 2020 when compared with the business-as-usual scenario).
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program). The Climate Stewardship Act, proposed by Senators McCain
and Lieberman, 177 and a recently issued EU Emissions Trading Directive
each adopt a similar approach. 178 The Climate Stewardship Act covers
large entities (including public agencies) with combined annual GHG
emissions (CO2,CH4, and N20) of more than 10,000 metric tons of CO2
equivalent in the electricity, industrial, and commercial sectors, 7 9 though
it is unclear whether emissions should be aggregated at the facility level
or at the company level. 80 The Act allows automobile manufacturers to
receive tradeable emissions credits, provided they exceed applicable
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards by at least 20
percent.' 81 The proposed Act does not provide an exact conversion factor
whereby improvements in average fuel economy are translated into a
certain number of GHG allowances; rather, the Act directs the Secretary
of Transportation, in consultation with the EPA, to determine the
82
conversion factor.
Under the EU Directive, sources exceeding industry-specific
production or capacity thresholds specified in the Directive in the
following four sectors are covered in the Phase I program, which lasts
from 2005 to 2007: (1) production and processing of iron and steel; (2)
minerals industries including cement, glass, and ceramic production; (3)
electricity and refineries; and (4) pulp and paper. 183 Each member nation
has the broad discretion to employ whichever policy tools it chooses
with regard to other source categories. The European Union may decide
to include other sources in the EU-wide cap-and-trade program in Phase
II or thereafter. 184

177. S. 139, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://www.theorator.com/billsl08/
s139.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Climate Stewardship Act].
178. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October
2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (Oct. 25, 2003) [hereinafter EU
Emissions Trading Directive].
179. Climate Stewardship Act, § 3(4), (8).
180. See id. § 3(7) ("The term 'facility' means a building, structure, or installation located
on any [one] or more contiguous or adjacent properties of an entity in the United States.").
181. Id. § 313(a).
182. Id. § 313(b).
183. See EU Emissions Trading Directive, supranote 178, Annex I. The EU Directive uses
the term "installations" instead of entities or sources. An installation is defined as "a
stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I are carried out and
any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection with the activities
carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution." Id. art.
3(e).
184. Id. art. 30, (2).
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ii. A "sectoral hybrid" approach
The weakness with a downstream approach covering only large
stationary sources is that under such an approach GHG emissions from
other small sources remain unaddressed1 85 Hence, government needs to
institute other regulatory programs targeting these sources. These
programs include technology-based equipment or product efficiency
standards.5 6 This so-called "sectoral hybrid" approach could be feasible
because it can "build[] on existing standards programs." 187 To be
effective, it is necessary to cap emissions from new equipment and
products because "product efficiency standards would not address the
intensity of product use or the replacement rate of new products for old,
less-efficient products," and would "create[] a bias that encourages
188
uneconomic life extension of older, less efficient equipment."
However, incorporating these sources into a cap-and-trade
program could create "double-counting of emission reductions" and
other administrative challenges. 89 Safeguards must be established to
prevent double-counting and to encourage technological improvements.
To bring about real benefits, the sectoral hybrid approach should be
accompanied by the establishment of new efficiency standards stringent
enough to induce energy conservation. This is an enormous task that will
take a great deal of time and entail huge costs. Given that increases in
energy prices are the most effective way of encouraging energy
conservation by consumers, the upstream approach is the preferred
policy option with regard to energy use in consumer products.
iii. A large-source downstream approach with upstream
components
There can be a hybrid approach that has both downstream and
upstream components. A hybrid approach is more complex to
administer than an upstream approach or a pure large-source
downstream approach because it must draw a distinction between
downstream and upstream flows of fossil fuels, thereby requiring "more
complex record keeping and enforcement," and because it must be
carefully designed to counter leaking problems. 90
Roughly speaking, the Climate Stewardship Act partially
embodies this hybrid approach; refiners and importers of foreign
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 155, at iv.
Id. at v-vi.
Id. at vi.
Id.; FISCHER ET AL., supra note 142, at 7.
Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 155, at vi.
FISCHER ET AL., supra note 142, at 6.
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petroleum products to be used in the transportation sector are required
to participate in a cap-and-trade program if they produce or import
petroleum products that, when used in transportation, will emit over
10,000 metric tons of CO 2 equivalent, including HFCs, PFCs, or SF 6
emissions. 191 Therefore, despite the 10,000 metric ton ceiling, the Climate
Stewardship Act expects to cover over 90 percent of CO 2 emissions and
about 80 percent of all U.S. GHG emissions. 192 On the other hand, the EU
Directive includes oil refineries as one of the covered industrial
categories. 93 Combined CO2 emissions of sources covered by the
Directive are estimated to cover 46 percent of total EU CO 2 emissions. 194
"The main distinguishing feature of the hybrid approach is that
it could be used to allocate emissions permits to large sources of
emissions, as was done in the SO2 program." 195 Certainly, the hybrid
approach will make permit allocation processes manageable when
compared to the pure downstream approach. But the free allocation of
CO 2 allowances to existing sources will put clean new sources at a
competitive disadvantage because grandfathered allowances are
essentially scarcity rents to existing sources. 196 Policy makers must pay
special attention to this equity concern and its ramifications for
environmental quality when choosing a main allocation method.
c. Conclusion
In summary, an upstream approach is superior to other
approaches if it can properly address distributional impacts. 97 If a pure
upstream approach does not overcome expected political opposition
because of the approach's potential economy-wide impacts, the secondbest approach is the hybrid approach. This approach primarily covers
large industrial sources with supplemental features, such as inclusion of
upstream components or product efficiency standards that are aimed at

191.

Climate Stewardship Act, §§ 3(4)(B), 311(a)(2)-(3).

192. SERGEY PALTSEV ET AL., REPORT No. 97 OF MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON THE SCIENCE AND
POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, EMIssioNs TRADING TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES: THE MCCAIN-LIEBERMAN PROPOSAL 2 (June 2003), available at http://

www.rff.org/rff/Events/loader.cfm?url=/commnonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=115
49 [hereinafter MIT Study].
193. See EU Emissions Trading Directive, supra note 178, Annex I.
194. JOSEPH KRUGER & WILLIAM A. PIZER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, DISCUSSION
PAPER NO. 04-24, THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING DIREC7IVE: OPPORTUNITIES AND POTENTIAL

PITFALLS 4 (Apr. 2004), availableat http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-04-24.pdf.
195.

FISCHER ET AL., supra note 142, at 6.

196.
197.

See id. at 9.
Nordhaus & Danish, supra note 155, at iii- vi.
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reducing energy use in consumer products. 198 If a cap-and-trade
program is used instead of a carbon tax, its principal allowance
allocation method should be revenue-raising auctioning based on the
carbon content of fossil fuels. This is also true of a carbon tax.
Implementation of a carbon tax program should accompany reductions
in distortionary taxes on capital and labor.
If other GHGs are covered, the GWP of each of the regulated
non-C02 GHGs can be used as the basis for allowance allocations.
Whereas the EU Directive covers only CO 2 emissions during Phase I,199
the Climate Stewardship Act takes the comprehensive approach,
proposing to allocate GHG emissions allowances to large downstream
sources and refiners or importers of foreign petroleum products whose
combined annual GHG emissions exceed 10,000 metric tons of CO2
equivalent. Therefore, the proposed Act converts other non-CO 2
emissions into a certain amount of GHG emissions using an
internationally recognized index in which scientists estimate the relative
ability of each of the five non-CO 2 GHGs to affect climate change. As will
be discussed infra in Section C.3. of this part, a future GHG cap-andtrade program should also contain flexibility features such as banking
and offsets in order to help the nation make the smooth transition to a
less carbon-intensive society.
2. Allocation Methods: Auctioning or Grandfatheringand Its Economic Impacts
a. Economic Studies of Allocation Methods
Burtraw et al. studied the cost-effectiveness and distributional
impacts of each of the following three allocation methods in the
electricity industry: (1) 100% auctioning; (2) 100% grandfathering; and (3)
100% free allocation based on each producer's market share, a so-called
output-based generation performance standard (GPS).200 Using the
198.
199.

Id.
See EU Emissions Trading Directive, supranote 178.

200. DALLAS BuRTRAw ET AL., RESOURCEs FOR THE FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER 01-30, THE
EFFECT OF ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION ON THE COST OF CARBON EMISSION TRADING 11-12

(Aug. 2001), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-01-30.pdf. Note that
nuclear and hydro-electric power generators are excluded from consideration. Id. at 11. The
GPS is implemented in three steps. First, the relevant authority calculates the amount of
total allowable emissions. Second, it establishes the same emission rate that is applicable to
all new and existing sources based on the source's actual electricity generation in a given
year "by dividing the cap by the expected generation for that region over a set period of
time." Third, it updates allowance allocations periodically, reflecting variations in each of
the covered sources' market share of total net electricity generation over time. See Ellen
Roy, The Uniform GenerationPerformance Standard: Connecting Electric Industry Restructuring
andAir Quality Improvement, ELEC. J., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 57.
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Haiku model developed by Resources for the Future, they found that
100% auctioning would be 50% more cost-effective than grandfathering
20
or the GPS in terms of total social costs associated with CO 2 reductions. '
According to the study, auctioning would raise electricity prices
the most but result in the lowest natural gas prices. 2 2 The GPS would
minimize electricity price increases, but it would increase natural gas
prices the most because of the highest demand for natural gas induced
by GPS policy. 203 The lowest electricity prices result from increased
electricity generation because the GPS functions as an output subsidy by
rewarding more productive energy sources.2°4
At first blush, it seems that the GPS would be preferable, since it
would favor more energy-efficient -hence cleaner-fossil fuel combustion technologies such as combined-cycle gas turbines, in addition to
bringing lower electricity prices. However, Burtraw et al. found that it
would be less cost-effective than the auctioning approach. The main
reason is that the benefits derived from the GPS would not be as great: it
"amplifies" existing distortions in current electricity markets resulting
from rate regulation and inefficient pricing, thus raising total economic
cost.20 5 For instance, low electricity prices result in reduced profits and
20 6
thereby "erode[] the value of existing assets."
In terms of price impact, grandfathering is in the middle
between the GPS and full auctioning, with modest price increases in both
electricity and natural gas. 2°7 But grandfathering would greatly reduce
consumer surplus and increase producer surplus by substantially
increasing profits and asset values, because it constitutes "a substantial
transfer of wealth to producers from consumers." 2°
Burtraw et al. concluded that the auctioning approach represents
the most cost-effective allocation method; consumers benefit from price
discounts in the form of lump-sum annual payments when auction
revenue is recycled. 209 In their discussion of the double dividend effect
and revenue neutrality, the researchers pointed out that the costs of the
auctioning policy would be significantly reduced when combined with
reductions in other distortionary taxes. 210 They also suggested that a
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

BURTRAw ET AL., supra note 200, at 28.

Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

28-29.
29.
30.
28.
29.
30.
29.
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portion of the revenue could be used to compensate producers, which
implies that auctioning can be phased-in over time, beginning as partial
grandfathering combined with GPS initially and "culminating in an
auction of all allowances in future years." 211 Furthermore, some of the
revenue, or "direct allocation of some allowances, could be directed to
212
finance energy conservation and other benefit programs."
In short, auctioning has several important institutional features
that provide maximum flexibility to policy makers while creating an
additional revenue stream. 213 Finally, Burtraw et al. observed that major
findings in their study would be applicable to other industrial sectors,
and that "[the electricity sector] would be expected to contribute twothirds to three-quarters of the emission reductions" under a cost-effective
214
economy-wide policy.
In another study, Professor Lawrence Goulder found that a
carbon tax or CO 2 emissions trading could effectively level costs to
industry if a small portion of the revenue collected is returned to some of
the hardest-hit upstream industries. At the outset, Goulder noted that
grandfathering would have the effect of creating an uneven playing
field; downstream users of carbon-containing fossil fuels would bear
much more severe burdens than regulated upstream industries, which in
some cases benefit from increased profits.215 This is because most of the
cost increases are expected to pass through to downstream industries
and consumers. 216 Thus, he argued either for auctioning as the primary
method of permit allocation in emissions trading or for a carbon tax
system without tax exemptions, whose revenue should be recycled to
consumers and the most vulnerable firms to cut labor and corporate
217
taxes.

211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.

215. LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE DISCUSSION PAPER 02-22,
MITIGATING THE ADVERSE IMPACTS OF CO 2 ABATEMENT POLICIES ON ENERGY-INTENSIVE

INDUSTRJES 2 (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-02-22.pdf
(last visited Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter GOULDER I] ("By compelling fossil fuel suppliers to
restrict their outputs, the government effectively causes firms to behave like a cartel,
leading to higher prices and the potential for excess profit"); see also id. at 18 and tbl. 3
(projecting an increase in equity values by a factor of seven).
216. LAWRENCE H. GOULDER, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE CLIMATE ISSUES BRIEF No. 23,
CONFRONTING THE ADVERSE INDUSTRY IMPACTS OF CO 2 ABATEMENT POLICIES: WHAT DOES IT

COST? 3 (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-CCIB-23.pdf
[hereinafter GOULDER II].
217. GOULDER I, supra note 215, at 5-7.
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Goulder, along with a Dutch researcher named Bovenberg,
concluded that a partial grandfathering regime would absorb most of the
potential profit losses if only 13 percent of the total revenue were
returned to most affected industries based on fossil fuel usage in the
form of partial free permit allocation, tax exemptions, or reduced
corporate taxes, with resultant cost increases constituting only a small
portion of the potential revenue. 218 In arriving at this conclusion,
Goulder divided U.S. industry into 13 sectors and estimated changes in
after-tax profits between 2002 and 2025 under ten different scenarios
(from Al to C4). 219 These scenarios included repayments to households
in the form of either lump-sum annual payments or marginal rate
reductions in personal income tax with no revenue recycling to
industries, 100% auctioning, 100% grandfathering, partial grandfathering, and carbon taxes combined with corporate tax credits. 220 A $25
per metric ton of carbon tax was used as the basis for calculating cost
change. 221
The study found that coal mining, petroleum refining, electric
utilities, oil and gas, and metals and machinery would be most adversely
affected by a 100% auctioning policy that does not provide for partial
compensation. 222 Lowered marginal personal income tax rates would be
economically more efficient than annual lump-sum rebates, as the former
would minimize "the distortionary costs of the personal income tax"
more effectively. 223 Free allocation of only 13 percent of permits would
raise overall economic costs by only 7.4% relative to total cost under
100% auctioning, while offsetting most of the profit losses in these
industries. 224 This finding was in a stark contrast to an estimated 87%
cost increase under the 100% grandfathering scenario. 22
Goulder found that a carbon tax system combined with
corporate tax credits in the form of lump-sum payments, rather than
reductions in marginal corporate tax rates, would increase the efficiency
cost of a no-compensation scheme by 1.5% in the coal and oil and gas
industries, and by 0.3% when considering only petroleum refining,
electric utilities, and metals and machinery. 226

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 2.
See id. tbl. 1.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 18 and tbls. 1 & 3.
Id. at 14-15 & tbl. 4.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18 and tbl. 4.
Id. at 18.
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The main reason why efficiency losses from corporate tax
reductions are relatively small is two-fold. First, the corporate tax has
greater distortionary effects than the personal income tax. 227 Second, it is
expected that most of the cost increases would be shifted to downstream
industries, but these costs would then be passed down to the
consumer. 228 Goulder did not consider labor impacts 229 or compensation
schemes for preventing potential profit losses in other industries, though
he observed that the amount of required revenues would be small as
well.23
To summarize, the studies discussed above demonstrate three
important issues. First, grandfathering constitutes "scarcity rents" to
upstream industries. Second, auctioning (or its carbon tax equivalent) is
the most efficient way of burden spreading, since revenue recycling can
solve both economic efficiency and distributional equity issues most
effectively. Third, by adopting a partial grandfathering scheme (or a
carbon tax system combined with corporate tax credits), auctioning (or
its carbon tax equivalent) can minimize short-term cost impact on
carbon-intensive industries while slightly impacting the program's
performance, foregoing only a very small percentage of its revenue.
b. The Dominant Use of Grandfathering
Despite its theoretical superiority, auctioning has never been
used in a revenue raising manner anywhere in the world. Instead,
grandfathering has persisted as the dominant allocation method. The EU
Directive provides that up to five percent of allowances may be
auctioned during the first commitment period (and up to ten percent
during the second phase).231 The Climate Stewardship Act proposes the
establishment of an emissions cap, which is to be reduced in two phases.
During Phase I, which runs from 2010 through 2015, the emissions cap is
to be 5,896 million metric tons of CO 2 equivalent; after that period, it is to
be reduced to 5,123 million metric tons of CO 2 equivalent. 232 These
emissions caps include the amount of actual emissions of non-covered
sources in 2000 and in 1990, respectively, in reference to the EPA's 2002
GHG emissions inventory. 233 One tradeable allowance must be held for
227. GOULDER H, supra note 216, at 10.
228. GOULDER I, supra note 215, at 18.
229. GOULDER II, supra note 216, at 12 (estimating that $2.8 billon would be needed for
labor compensation relative to $15 billon required to compensate capital owners).
230. GOULDER I, supranote 215, at 19.
231. EU Emissions Trading Directive, supra note 178, art. 10.
232. Climate Stewardship Act § 331(a).
233. Id.
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every metric ton of CO2 equivalent emitted. 234 Covered petroleum
refiners or importers must submit one allowance for every unit of
sector that will
petroleum product they sell for use in the transportation
235
ultimately emit one metric ton of CO 2 equivalent.

Of total allowances, the maximum number of allowances held by
a covered sector is to be equal to its baseline emissions in 1990 and in
2000, during Phase I and Phase I, respectively, based on the EPA's 2002
GHG emissions inventory. 236 The allowable emissions of each entity
within the same covered sector are to be equal to its share of the total
237
sectoral emissions in the year preceding the passage of the Act. Hence,

the emissions reduction target set by the Act shows that it aims to
achieve the GHG stabilization goal under the UNFCCC. In addition, the
Act provides for a two-year review of the number of allowances to
determine whether it continues to be consistent with the objectives of the
UNFCCC, without specifying what action needs to be taken if the
number of allowances is found to be inconsistent. 238
The Climate Stewardship Act provides for a rather complex
process of partial auctioning and partial grandfathering essentially
comprised of three steps. First, based on six guiding principles, 239 the
Secretary of Commerce is directed to apportion allowances between
covered sectors for free allocation by the EPA, covered entities claiming
early reduction credits, and a Climate Change Credit Corporation for
auction,24° which is to be established as a not-for-profit federal entity. 241
Id. § 311(a)(1).
Id. § 311(a)(3).
Id. § 331(a).
Id. § 3(11)-(12).
Id. § 336.
The Secretary of Commerce shall consider the following six factors:
(1) the distributive effect of the allocations on household income and net
worth of individuals; (2) the impact of the allocations on corporate income,
taxes, and asset value; (3) the impact of the allocations on income levels of
consumers and on their energy consumption; (4) the effects of the
allocations in terms of economic efficiency; (5) the ability of covered
entities to pass through compliance costs to their customers; and (6) the
degree to which the amount of allocations to the covered sectors should
decrease over time.
Id. § 332(b).
240. Id. §§ 332(a), 3(11)-(12).
241. Section 351 provides that "[t]he Corporation shall not be considered to be an
agency or establishment of the United States Government." Id. § 351(a).
Of the five members comprising the board of directors: No more than
[three] members of the board serving at any time may be affiliated with
the same political party. The members of the board shall be appointed by
the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate and shall serve for terms of [five] years.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
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But an exact ratio of each category of allowances is unknown. Second,
the EPA is then required to allocate allowances to each covered sector
and the Climate Change Credit Corporation, 242 with a percentage of
allowances going to early reduction units. Third, the EPA distributes
allowances to covered entities within the same group, and the Climate
Change Credit Corporation auctions off its allocated allowances. 243
Although the Climate Change Credit Corporation is authorized
to administer auctions, 244 it does not remain as the mere auctioneer. It
may also purchase allowances and sell them to any natural or legal
person in the secondary trading market, but it is prohibited from
permanently retiring unused allowances. 245 The Act does not require the
Corporation to dispose of all the allowances it holds during any specific
compliance period. The Corporation is directed to use the proceeds of
allowance trading and auctions to reduce costs to consumers, which
would increase as a result of implementation of the Act's GHG reduction
requirements. The Corporation is further directed to distribute the
proceeds to the extent possible among all regions of the nation in an
equitable manner and consider the hardships of low-income families
particularly. 246
The Act illustrates possible methods of financial assistance but
does not express a preference or state what mix of methods should be
used. 247 It specifically provides for transition assistance to dislocated
workers and communities 248 and establishes a specified percentage of the
total proceeds to be used for financial assistance purposes, starting at 20
percent in 2010 and declining by two percent each year after that;
however, it may not reach zero. 249
The text of the Act is silent on various allocation-related issues
and does not make clear the precise method for recycling auction
Id. § 351(c).
242. Id. § 333(a).
243. The EPA is required to consider the following factors:
(1) encourage investments that increase the efficiency of the processes that
produce greenhouse gas emissions; (2) minimize the costs to the
government of allocating the tradeable allowances; (3) not penalize a
covered entity for registered emissions reductions made before 2010; and
(4) provide sufficient allocation for new entrants into the sector.
Id. § 333(b).
244. Actually, the Act does not use the term "auctions."
245. Id. § 352(a).
246. Id. §§ 352(b)(1)(B)-(C).
247. Id. § 352(b)(1)(A) ("buy-down, subsidy, negotiation of discounts, consumer rebates,
or otherwise").
248. Id. § 352(b)(2).
249. Id. § 352(b)(3).
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revenue. It merely delegates the authority to allocate allowances to the
executive branch. Thus, there is no way to predict what role the Climate
Change Credit Corporation might play in promoting GHG reductions
and addressing distributional equity issues.
It appears that financial assistance can be characterized as a
transition subsidy rather than as a method of revenue cycling, given that
the six guiding principles do not specifically mention the double
dividend effect that economists argue revenue recycling generates. This
implies that the administrative process would restrict the use of
auctioning as a primary allocation method and hence prevent its full
potential for enhancing economic efficiency. If that is the case, the Act
would function as a de facto grandfathering scheme.
3. Flexibility Features of Emissions Trading
The following features of emissions trading offer maximum
flexibility to regulated firms, make possible a smooth transition, and
reduce short-term compliance costs: early reduction credits, banking and
borrowing, opt-in, and offsets. At the same time, their successful
implementation contributes to the accomplishment of both short- and
long-term environmental goals by giving firms financial incentives to
reduce pollution beyond the required levels.
a. Early Reduction Credits, Banking, and Borrowing
i. Early reduction credits
Early reduction credits differ from banking in that the credits
could be claimed for early reductions of pollutants before the compliance
period actually begins. The recognition of early reduction credits is
especially valuable in the inter-temporal context of climate change. One
ton of carbon reduction today has the same effect as it would have in
future years. In view of the fact that most GHGs have a very long
residence time once emitted, recognition of early reduction credits would
bring more environmental benefits.
The success of a climate stabilization policy requires technological solutions and pursuit of sustainable energy development, both
of which take considerable time to materialize. As implementation of
GHG reduction activity is delayed, its benefits become smaller and
compliance costs increase. Allowing for early reduction credits
eliminates regulatory uncertainty, induces regulated firms to pursue
low-cost reduction opportunities early on, and provides them with lead
time to achieve environmental comparability by making adjustments to
production processes through experimentation and innovation. In this
way, it can reduce overall social costs of GHG reductions.
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Implementation of early reduction programs could raise credibility
issues, however. To ensure that claimed early reductions reflect real
progress, government must establish a reliable verification program.
The Kyoto Protocol does not allow the use of early reduction
credits, except in the CDM context.250 Under the Climate Stewardship
Act, a covered entity can request that the EPA allocate allowances for
emissions reductions registered with the national GHG database prior to
Phase I for its use in the current year during any compliance period. 251
Non-covered entities may also opt to register early GHG reductions. 25 2
Entities can also claim allowances for actual emissions reductions if they
contribute to a net increase in carbon sequestration capability outside
25 3
their facilities.
The proposed Act provides for another mechanism designed to
encourage early action. If a covered entity carries out a voluntary
agreement with the EPA under which it agrees to cut its GHG emissions
to 1990 levels by 2010, it is entitled to receive bonus allowances. 254 Early
action allowances are completely fungible. Thus, they can be sold to
other entities or banked for future use without being subject to any
restrictions.
Notably, the Act requires that the emissions cap not change.
Allowances awarded for early action increase the number of allowances
that can be allocated to early reduction units while reducing the total
number of allowances available to other covered units. It should be
noted, however, that there is uncertainty about the total size of early
action credits, since it is to be determined by the Secretary of Commerce.
If most of the registered early reductions are automatically translated
into allowances for use in subsequent years, early action incentives
would work successfully as intended, because covered entities will
engage in reduction activities prior to Phase I in hopes of getting a larger
allocation.255
Early reduction credits can be claimed for emissions reductions
achieved after 1990. Therefore, early action programs favor entities
whose historical emissions have declined for reasons other than sincere

250. All CDM projects that began prior to the year 2000 may obtain CERs if they are
submitted for registration to the Executive Board before December 31, 2005, and the
crediting period may start prior to the date of registration but not earlier than January 1,
2000. See Marrakesh Accords, supra note 20, Add., pt. 2, vol. II, at 23.
251. Climate Stewardship Act, §§ 334(1)(B), 334(2).
252. Id. § 203(a)(2).
253. Id. § 203(c)(2)(B)(ii).
254. Id. § 335(a).
255. See MIT Study, supra note 192, at 8.
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reduction efforts. 256 If both covered and uncovered entities, for which
reliable historical emissions data do not exist, were allowed to obtain
early reduction credits under generous government policy, claimed
reductions would not reflect real environmental benefits.
The Climate Stewardship Act imposes voluntary reporting
requirements on entities that apply to receive early action credits.
Entities are required to submit to the EPA an annual emissions report
27
beginning in any preceding calendar year before the specified date. 5
They must submit to the EPA, for inclusion in the registry, all
information on any entity-wide emissions reduction activities, including
detailed information about any project or activity that has allegedly
resulted in entity-wide GHG emissions reductions or actual increases in
net sequestration outside their facilities. 2 8
All information must be reported in accordance with
measurement and verification methods and standards to be developed
by the EPA under the Act259 and must be verified by the EPA to make
sure that claimed reductions reflect actual progress. The amount of
reduced GHG emissions must be determined relative to the applying
entity's historical emissions after accounting for any increases in
"indirect emissions from imported electricity, heat, and steam" and
actual increases in net sequestration. 26° Entities may either "obtain
independent third-party verification" or "present the results of the thirdparty verification" to the EPA for approval. 261
It does not appear that early reduction programs under the Act
contain significant loopholes. As pointed out above, credibility issues
may or may not arise, depending on the EPA's generosity in approval of
early reduction credits. If the EPA applies strict rules in the verification
process, it is expected that early action may be deterred, especially on the
part of non-covered entities.
ii. Banking and Borrowing
Under the SO 2 Acid Rain Program, banking of early reduction
credits resulted in over-compliance by a wide margin during Phase 1.262
Emissions of SO 2 from Phase II units have exceeded annual allowance

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Climate Stewardship Act, § 203(a)-(c).
Id. § 203(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 203(c)(3).
Id. §§ 203(c)(1)(C)(i), 203(c)(3).
Id. § 203(c)(5).
See supratext accompanying note 78.
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allocations as electric utilities have begun to use banked allowances. 263
But the actual SO 2 emissions have been much lower than total allowable
264
emissions and, most importantly, have continued to decline over time.
Concerns about hot spots have not been realized thus far. 265 This
indicates that banking encourages continuous reductions by regulated
firms that want to cushion against permit violations in future years, and
that early compliance makes it possible for firms to find low-cost
263. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, EPA-430-R-04-009, ACID RAIN PROGRAM: 2003
PROGRESS REPORT 4, fig. 2 (2004).
264. See id.
265. Several studies also confirmed that allowance trading has served to cool, rather
than create, hot spots, mainly because largest emissions reductions have come from the
highest emissions sources. See, e.g., Byron Swift, Allowance Trading and S02 Hot Spots - Good
News from the Acid Rain Program, 31 ENV'T REP. 954 (2000); A. DENNY ELLERMAN, MIT's CTR.
FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. POLICY RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER No. 2003-015,ARE CAP-ANDTRADE PROGRAMS MORE ENVIRONMENTALLY EFFECTIVE THAN CONVENTIONAL REGULATION?

(2003), available at http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/2003-015.pdf. According to the EPA's
own analysis of trading patterns during Phase I, most activities took place within the
approximately 200-mile radius. U.S. EPA, GIS Analysis: Geographic Mean Centers of S02
Allowance Trading Activity 1995-1999: Plants Acquiring Allowance for Compliance,
Beyond Each Year's Allocation; Plants Supplying these Allowances, (Oct. 28, 2002), at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/cmap/trading.html. Byron Swift recently concluded that
the SO2 allowance allocation method based on historical heat input, not on historical
emissions, may help partly explain why disproportionately significant reductions have
been achieved by midwestern sources, since it "results in dirty plants receiving far fewer
allowances in comparison to their past emissions than cleaner plants of a similar size."
Byron Swift, Emissions Trading and Hot Spots: A Review of the Major Programs, 35 ENVT REP.
1020, 1035 (2004). The OTC made a similar finding with regard to its NOx cap-and-trade
program. After analyzing changes in average and peak daily NOx emissions from CAA
Title IV units in the region and in ambient NOx levels on the days with the highest
emissions from these units before and after implementation of the trading program, the
OTC preliminarily concluded that NOx trading did not seem to have contributed to
creating hot spots. OTC NOx TRADING REPORT FOR 1999-2002, supra note 172, at 8.
Consistent with the conclusion of the OTC's progress report, the EPA's progress report
analyzing the performance of its NBP in participating states also confirmed that NOx
trading did not create temporal spikes in NOx emissions, observing that the emissions
trend in OTC states from 1997 through 2003 showed that "a seasonal trading program
[could] reduce peak daily emission levels" as well as average daily emissions. EPA NBP
REPORT FOR 2003, supra note 27, at 13-14. Because excessive banking could create localized

hot spots in urban areas, the "progressive flow control" mechanism has been used to deter
over-reliance by sources on banking of unused allowances under both the OTC NOx capand-trade program and the EPA's NBP. Progressive flow control is triggered when the total
number of banked allowances from all sources exceeds ten percent of the annual regional
NOx budget for the next compliance period. See OTC NOx CAP-AND-TRADE MODEL RULE,
supra note 27, at 20. Once it is triggered, a flow control ratio is calculated by dividing ten
percent of the annual budget by the number of all banked allowances. Id. at 21. The
resultant flow control ratio then applies to all sources with banked allowances. In other
words, the ratio indicates the percentage of banked allowances that can be used at a onefor-one ratio; the remaining percentage indicates the number of banked allowances that can
be used at a two-for-one ratio in the next compliance period. Id.
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compliance options for pollution reductions without significantly
restricting output. Banking of GHG reductions does not create "hot
spots" because climate change is not a local phenomenon. The possibility
of increased emissions in subsequent years can be effectively dealt with
by making periodical downward adjustments to the emissions cap.
The non-availability of feasible post-combustion controls on
GHG emissions means that climate policy actually constitutes
restrictions on production output. Banking allows firms to increase
emissions in response to short-term high demand in the marketplace. It
"improve[s] efficiency when regulatory targets are such that marginal
266
control cost is rising over time faster than the relevant rate of interest."
Therefore, "[u]nder these circumstances, some [allowances] are more
valuable when used to offset future abatement costs than if they are used
267
today."
Borrowing adds flexibility to implementation of the emissions
trading program. Borrowing allows for long-term investments in
technological innovation without "excessive capital obsolescence,"
considering the fact that "the composition of energy-using capital is
more flexible in the longer term than in the shorter term, and [that]
tougher short-term requirements provide relatively less opportunity to
embed technical improvements over time." 268 If it turns out that
technological solutions to GHG reductions cannot be developed in the
near term, borrowing would function as a buffer against price volatility
in the GHG allowance trading market.
One of the criticisms of borrowing is that it can "retard some
induced innovation and learning-by-doing" anticipated to take place in
the near future "by lowering energy prices below what would have
occurred with tighter standards." 269 This concern would not materialize
if more stringent requirements are phased-in in a timely manner and if
some of the revenue produced from implementation of the borrowing
program is directed to support research and development activity.
Under the EU Directive, each member nation has the discretion
to decide whether and how banking and borrowing will be permitted. It
may prohibit the use of banking in the first compliance period (from
2005 to 2007) but is required to allow banking beginning in the second

266. CAROLYN FISCHER, Suzi KERR & MICHAEL TOMAN, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
CLIMATE ISSUE BRIEF No.11, USING EMISSIONS TRADING TO REGULATE U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS: ADDITIONAL POLICY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 5 (June 1998), available

at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-CCIB-11.pdf.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 6.
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period, which corresponds to the first commitment period under the
270
Kyoto Protocol.
The Climate Stewardship Act allows unlimited banking 271 and
limited borrowing. A covered entity can borrow future allowances based
on "anticipated reductions in emissions in a future calendar year." 272 The
Act authorizes the EPA Administrator to borrow credits in reliance on an
entity's promise of anticipated emissions reductions that:
(1) are attributable to the realization of capital investments
in equipment, the construction, reconstruction, or
acquisition of facilities, or the deployment of new
technologies (A) for which the covered entity has executed a binding
contract and secured, or applied for, all necessary
permits and operating or implementation authority;
(B) that will not become operational within the current
calendar year; and
(C) that will become operational and begin to reduce
emissions from the covered source within [five] years
after the year in which the [borrowed] credit is used; and
(2) will be realized within [five] years after the year in
273
which the credit is used.
A ten-percent annual interest rate is applied to each credit until
the year the reduction is actually made, 274 and the maximum borrowing
period is limited to five years. 275 If the covered entity fails to achieve the
promised reductions, its allowance requirements must be increased by
the amount of borrowed credits, plus borrowing costs, and it is barred
from using any borrowed credits to meet the increased purchase
276
requirements.
The Act's borrowing program is well designed to induce
emissions reductions in time and to prevent delays in compliance with
reduction requirements. There is a high possibility that the program's
highly prescriptive nature would lead to underutilization, because
industry will consider the Act's borrowing requirements burdensome.
But this cannot be described as a significant design flaw and is not likely

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See EU Emissions Trading Directive, supra note 178, art. 13 and pmbl.
Climate Stewardship Act, § 315(d).
Id. § 314(a).
Id. § 314(b).
Id. § 314(c).
Id. § 314(d).
Id. § 314(e).

(9).
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to increase compliance costs since covered entities can significantly
reduce short- and long-term costs using other features of the Act's
emissions trading program, including unlimited banking and
international emissions trading.
b. Opt-In Requirements: Promises and Pitfalls -The Need for
Sophisticated Monitoring Requirements
Opt-in allows non-covered units to voluntarily participate in
emissions trading. Thus, compliance costs to covered units may be
reduced if the number of opt-in units is large enough to have a wide
cost-spreading effect. It can also induce faster improvements in
environmental quality over the long run as more and more units choose
to comply with reduction requirements.
The experience with the SO 2 Acid Rain Program teaches us that
the problem of strategic arbitrage or high transaction costs must be
prevented to ensure the successful implementation of an opt-in program.
The major beneficiaries of the opt-in program were large electric utilities.
Many electric utilities obtained extra allowances for the emissions
reductions made in opt-in units or permanently retired units under their
control.277 While these claimed reductions have had a minimal impact on
emissions increases exceeding the statutory cap during Phase I,278 they
appear to have suppressed allowance prices by creating an oversupply
of tradeable allowances in the first several years of Phase I.
On the other hand, the participation of industrial cogeneration
units and small electric utilities has been low. Industrial facilities have
abstained from opting-in to the SO 2 allowance trading program due to
high costs involving the establishment of baseline emissions levels and
the installation and maintenance of the CEMS. 279 In the case of small

utilities, the "thermal energy" requirement has prohibited them from
selling unused allowances after shutting down some of the old units
within their control.280 While it is designed to prevent leakage, the
277. A. Denny Ellerman et al., Emissions Trading in the U.S.: Experience, Lessons, and
Considerations for Greenhouse Gases 19 (prepared for the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, May 2003), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/emissions%5
Ftrading%2Epdf.
278. Id. (stating that "'anyway emissions reductions' accounted for less than two
percent of total emissions over the first ten-year period of Phase II").
279. Id. at 18-19.
280. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651i(f) (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 72.2 (2005) (defining thermal energy as
"the thermal output produced by a combustion source used directly as part of a
manufacturing process but not used to produce electricity"). See also Am. Mun. Power-Ohio
v. EPA, 98 F.3d 1372, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (upholding the EPA's regulatory definition of
thermal energy).
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requirement has discouraged the participation of small municipal
utilities because they would have to purchase allowances for use in new
units in the trading market if they retire old units after opting-in.
In short, an opt-in program creates trade-offs. It allows large
covered sources, for which a real-time monitoring system is already in
place or whose emissions can be easily monitored without incurring
significant costs, to easily spread costs at the company level; however,
allowances claimed for emissions reductions taking place in their opt-in
units may not represent real improvements in environmental quality. In
essence, they are nothing but free rents to these sources. On the other
hand, while it is certainly true that a careful case-by-case certification
should be required of opt-in units owned by small sources in order to
prevent the problem of paper credits and possible emission increases in
their non-opt-in units, stringent enforcement discourages voluntary
participation by these units. 281 More simple and flexible rules need to be
developed to reduce these tradeoffs to a minimum.
The EU Directive does not contain opt-in features, largely
because each member nation can freely implement a national opt-in
program within its borders. Under the Climate Stewardship Act, an
uncovered entity may opt-in to the system and, if it chooses to do so, is
required to comply with monitoring, reporting, and verification
requirements applicable to other covered units.
The proposed Act requires that, "[n]ot later than July 1st of each
calendar year beginning more than [two] years after the date of
enactment," each entity, including both covered and opt-in units, must
submit to the EPA an annual emissions report showing its entity-wide
GHG emissions in the preceding calendar year at the facility level. Every
participating entity must record and report all relevant GHG emissions,
which include (1) "indirect emissions from imported electricity, heat,
and steam"; (2) "process and fugitive emissions"; and (3) "production or
importation of greenhouse gases," "as the Administrator determines
282
may be practicable and useful for the purposes of this Act."
...
Monitoring and verification rules are to be issued by the
Secretary of Commerce "not later than [one] year after the date of
enactment," and should mandate the use of a continuous monitoring
system or any other equivalent system that "is determined by the
Secretary to provide information with the same precision, reliability,
accessibility, and timeliness as a continuous emissions monitoring

281.
282.

Ellerman et al., supra note 277, at 20.
Climate Stewardship Act, § 203(c)(1) (2003).
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system provides." 283 Furthermore, the Climate Stewardship Act directs
the Secretary of Commerce to establish
standardized measurement and verification practices for
reports made by all entities participating in the registry,
taking into account: (i) protocols and standards in use by
entities desiring to participate in the registry as of the date
of development of the methods and standards...; (ii)
boundary issues, such as leakage and shifted use; (iii)
avoidance of double counting of greenhouse gas emissions
and emission reductions; (iv) protocols to prevent a
covered entity from avoiding the requirements of this Act
by reorganization into multiple entities that are under
common control; and (v) such other factors as the Secretary,
in consultation with the [EPA] Administrator, determines
to be appropriate. 2s4
The EU Directive makes the use of continuous emissions
monitoring optional and allows member nations and covered sectors to
choose emissions factors whose application is "coupled with fuel use or
production data to calculate their emissions." 285 The Directive requires
that each permit shall contain "monitoring requirements, specifying
monitoring methodology and frequency." 286 Emissions calculations must
287
consider activity data, emissions factors, and oxidation factors.
"Default [emissions] factors are acceptable for all fuels except for noncommercial ones." For refinery products, IPCC default values may be
used. 88 Default oxidation factors developed under the relevant EU
directive should be used, "unless the operator can demonstrate that
activity-specific factors are more accurate." 289 An additional oxidation
factor must be used "if the [applicable] emissions factor does not take
account of the fact that some of the carbon is not oxidised." 29° In
principle, emissions calculations must be made "for each activity,
installation, and for each fuel." 291

283. Id. § 204(a)(1)-(a)(2)(A).
284. Id. § 204(a)(2)(B).
285. KRUGER & PIZER, supra note 194, at 5.
286. EU Emissions Trading Directive, supra note 178, art. 6, 2(c).
287. The following equation should be used: total C02 emissions = activity data x
emission factor x oxidation factor. Id. Annex IV.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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The proposed EU guidance on monitoring procedures provides
for "different 'tiers' of methodologies with different degrees of assumed
accuracy." 292 The highest tier methodology for "general combustion
activities," such as direct fossil fuel combustion, allows only a maximum
permissible uncertainty of plus or minus one percent. 293 Higher tiers
generally require a facility-specific emissions factor to be used "for the
batch of fuel for which it was intended to be representative." 294 On the
other hand, the lowest tier methodology permits the use of standardized,
general emissions factors listed in the appendix of the guidance,
allowing a maximum permissible uncertainty of plus or minus 7.5
percent. 295
The chosen tier methodology must reflect maximum accuracy
that is "technically feasible and does not lead to unreasonably high
costs." 2% "The monitoring methodology shall be changed if this
improves the accuracy of the reported data, unless this is technically not
feasible or will lead to unreasonably high costs." 297 Under the proposed
guidance, covered sources may propose facility-specific methodologies
to the competent national authority. The operator of a covered source
may petition to use the next lower tier if he demonstrates "to the
satisfaction of the competent authority that the highest tier approach is
technically not feasible or will lead to unreasonably high costs." 298 To
improve monitoring accuracy, a covered source may also propose a
change to the tier methodology applicable to them due to (1) a change in
available data, (2) errors found in data that were the basis for choosing
the currently used methodology, or (3) the request by the competent
national authority for a change in methodology. 299 Waivers from use of
the top tiers do not lead to adjustments in emissions calculations.
The guidance addresses process sources, whose emissions are
defined as "[GHG] emissions.. .occurring as a result of intentional and
unintentional reactions between substances or their transformation,
including the chemical or electrolytic reduction of metal ores, the
thermal decomposition of substances, and the formation of substances
292. KRUGER & PIZER, supra note 194, at 18.
293. European Union Commission, Commission Decision of 29 January 2004
Establishing Guidelines for the Monitoring and Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Doc. No.
C(2004) 130, Annex II (Jan. 29, 2004).
294. See generally id.
295. Id.
296. Id. Annex I 4.2.2.1.4.
297. Id. Annex I 4.2.
298. Id. Annex I 4.2.2.1.4.
299. Id. Annex I 4.2.
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for use as product or feedstock." 300 The procedures employed to sample
and determine the composition of relevant material or to derive a
process-specific emission factor should be based on European
Committee for Standardization (CEN) standards, International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards, or equivalent national
standards, in descending order. 30 '
Where no applicable standards exist, procedures can be carried
out in accordance with "industry best practice guidelines." 302 The
laboratory used to determine the representative composition data or
emission factor "shall be accredited according to EN ISO 17025 ('General
requirements for the competence of testing and calibration
laboratories')." 30 3 "The determination of the process emission factors and
composition data for "batches of material shall follow generally accepted
[industry] practice for representative samping."304 The operator must
prove that the derived process emission factor or composition data "are
representative [of actual operations at his facility] and free of bias."305
The required use of the CEMS contributes to the integrity of a
cap-and-trade program and reduces its overall costs by saving
administrative costs associated with government enforcement and
litigation. However, mandating the use of the CEMS for all sources will
be neither technologically feasible nor economically justified. While the
concurrent use of emissions factors or other indirect emissions
calculation methods will be inevitable, a broader use of these imperfect
calculation methods could weaken GHG reduction goals and create
enforcement problems. This is one of the significant disadvantages of a
downstream approach versus an upstream approach. To ensure
accountability and induce technical improvements in emissions
calculations, conservative accounting rules and centralized verification
procedures need to be enforced.
For instance, under both the EU Directive and the Climate
Stewardship Act, the use of third-party certification is permissible.
Third-party certification may help to reduce administrative costs. But
certification costs are likely to become another economic burden to
industry 3°6 and can also create a dispute over standards and methods of
verification between the government and an entity. Some have pointed

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. Annex I 2(o).
Id. Annex I 10.2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
KRUGER & PIZER, supra note 194, at 19.
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out that "verifiers.. .may have an incentive to provide lower cost, less
stringent verification to compete." ° As a general matter, these and other
potential monitoring and enforcement problems are present in various
features of a downstream cap-and-trade program such as the EU
Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act.
Non-covered entities will respond to the cost-and-benefit
equation that will be influenced by the rigor of government enforcement
policy. They will likely participate in a cap-and-trade program only if
they are certain that low-cost reduction opportunities will abound in
their facilities, so that resulting benefits outweigh related costs. Noncovered entities owned by firms with economies of scale that are capable
of shifting production lines between facilities will likely choose to opt-in.
c. Offsets and International Emissions Trading: Credibility Issues
Offsets are project-based GHG reduction credits. Under carbon
a covered source can claim credits by funding carbon
trading,
offset
reduction activities such as carbon sequestration projects, based on
carbon removals, or by engaging in renewable energy projects, based on
avoided fossil fuel usage. Therefore, carbon sinks and renewable energy
sources participate in emissions trading indirectly. JI and the CDM
under the Kyoto Protocol, Oregon's siting law, and Texas's renewable
portfolio standard (RPS) policy 3° 8 are all examples of offset trading.
307. Id.
308. The most effective policy tool for increasing the market share of renewable energy
technologies is a renewable portfolio standard (RPS). In many cases, if not all, the RPS takes
the form of a "market-based" strategy because it is usually accompanied by a credit trading
mechanism. It thus provides flexibility to electric utilities in complying with the standard
requirement and rewards the most efficient, price-competitive renewable energy
technologies. The RPS, first developed by the American Wind Energy Association, in
essence is a variant on a cap-and-trade program that is designed to spur the development
of renewable energy sources in the electricity marketplace. Under the RPS, a covered utility
is required to make a certain percentage of its annual electricity sales come from renewable
energy. It can satisfy this percentage requirement by developing renewable energy sources
on its own, by purchasing renewable energy from third-party sources, or by financing
renewable energy projects. Compliance with the requirement can be determined by
checking the number of renewable energy certificates that hold a certain number of
renewable energy credits (REC) at the end of a given year. The standard method for
calculating the size of one credit is based on electricity generation output. The utility
subject to the RPS can compare the relative costs of the following two options: (1) selfgeneration and (2) acquisition of RECs from third-party sources. In this way, the utility can
minimize overall compliance costs by choosing a cheaper option, and price-competitive
renewable energy sources can boost its sales significantly. The general public can benefit
from improved air quality and reliable electric supplies. Hence, the RPS is the most
powerful and effective policy tool for accelerating the development of renewable energy
sources for it is a market-based mechanism that has the potential to enhance public policy
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Carbon offset trading raises problems associated with
establishing a baseline inventory and monitoring and verification of
claimed reductions, especially with regard to afforestation and
reforestation projects due to scientific uncertainty over how to gauge
GHG removal capacity by carbon sinks. In order for land use, land use
change, and forestry (LULUCF) activities to be effective in enhancing the
nation's GHG removal capacity in a real sense, comprehensive, longterm sustainable land use management plans and strategies should be
established and implemented simultaneously at the national level.
Otherwise, GHG removals induced by sink-creating activities will be
partially or wholly nullified by destructive forest management and
farming practices that increase GHG emissions, which take place outside
of the carbon sequestration projects (the problem of "leakage").
Other important relevant environmental goals, such as
biodiversity, should also become an integral part of a forest-related
carbon sequestration project. Monoculture plantations preoccupied with
the sole goal of achieving as many carbon removals as possible in a
speedy and cost-effective manner can easily compromise the health of
entire ecosystems, which, in some cases, constitute the economic and
cultural bases for indigenous peoples. Hence, forest and agricultural
management needs to be carried out in a manner that enhances the
overarching goal of sustainable development. 309
One good example of sustainable forest management is the state
of Oregon's siting and forest management programs. In Oregon,
proceeds from offset trading are used to promote afforestation and

goals with minimum cost to society. Texas's RPS is one prime example of a standard RPS
that is ideally designed. See TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (Vernon 1999). The successful
implementation of the state's RPS led to a "wind rush" in that state; 187 megawatt (MW) of
total wind power capacity installed in 1999 had grown to 1,101 MW by January 2002. AM.
WIND ENERGY ASS'N., INVENTORY OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR WIND ENERGY IN THE U.S.: A

STATE BY STATE SURVEY 105 (2002), available at http://www.awea.org/policy/
documents/inventory.PDF. Texas is behind only California in wind power generating
capacity installed, and it is expected to become "the nation's largest renewable energy
supplier" in coming decades. See Rabe, supra note 153, at 13. Encouraged by its RPS
program's performance, Texas has recently enacted new legislation that will increase the
current renewable energy requirement in two phases after 2010. S.B. 20, 2005 Leg., 79(1)
Sess. (Tex. 2005).
309. Under the Marrakesh Accords, the definition of "forest management" is modified
to incorporate the goal of sustainable forest management and to balance other important
environmental goals such as biodiversity: "a system of practices for stewardship and use of
forest land aimed at fulfilling relevant ecological (including biological diversity), economic
and social functions of the forest in a sustainable manner." Marrakesh Accords, supra note
20, vol. I, at 58.
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310
reforestation both in and out of state, as well as in foreign countries. In
addition, some of the carbon sequestration projects being implemented
in foreign countries are designed to provide financial incentives for
indigenous peoples to engage in sustainable forest management practice,
which can further biological and cultural diversity and help find a cure
311
for diseases.
The mandated use of conservative accounting methods or setting
a percentage limit on the use of credits can be a prescription for resolving
verification problems. Either approach can provide a disincentive to
exaggerate project results on the part of project participants. At the same
time, it encourages public and private efforts to enhance the ability to
measure GHG emission reductions by sinks. It is important to note,
however, that, as in the case of opt-in requirements, too strict
government accounting and certification rules could prevent carbon
sequestration projects from being implemented in the first place by
creating unacceptably high transaction costs. Therefore, it is necessary to
strike "a delicate balance between making the accounting system as
simple and transparent as possible to minimize transaction costs, and
creating enough rigor to ensure the environmental integrity of
312
projects."
In the case of renewable energy projects, numerous problems
attendant on the implementation of carbon sequestration projects do not
arise. This is because the amount of avoided fossil fuel combustion can
be used as a proxy for the amount of carbon emissions removed. In the
alternative, the direct participation of renewable energy sources in
emissions trading could be proposed. Direct allocations of allowances to
renewable energy sources would function as a much more powerful tool

310. Oregon explicitly makes C02 reductions a priority in its siting decisions. Oregon
law requires that, in order to obtain a site certificate, any proposed new or expanded power
plant must demonstrate that its net emission levels will not exceed 0.675 pounds per kWh
of electricity generated. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 469.300(9), 469.320, & 469.503 (1993); OR. ADMIN.
R. 345-024-0550 (1999). A proposed new or expanded facility can satisfy this obligation
either by employing cleaner energy technologies in accordance with the applicable
emissions standard or by purchasing C02 offsets through contracting out to carbon
mitigation projects. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503(2)(c)(A)-(B). Otherwise, the applying facility
owner has another option to fund sequestration projects by paying $0.57 for each ton of
CO2emissions removed. Id. § 469.503(2)(c)(C).
311. For example, the Oregon Climate Trust has sponsored an Ecuadorian carbon
sequestration project in collaboration with the Jatun Sacha Foundation and Conservation
International and carried out a carbon mitigation project together with Seattle City Light, a
municipally owned electric utility for Seattle. See Rabe, supra note 153, at 31-32.
312. David J. Hayes & Nicholas Gertler, The Role of Carbon Sequestration in the U.S.
Response to Climate Change-Challenges and Opportunities, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,350, 11,355
(2002).
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for accelerating the commercial development of renewable energy
technologies. 313 Thus, a future GHG emissions trading program could be
designed to allow renewable energy sources to directly participate in
allowance trading by setting aside some portion of the total allowances
to them; the preferred allocation method is the distribution of allowances
based on electricity generation (output-based) or a "renewable set-aside"
314
requirement.
Alternatively, nationwide RPS policy can be a perfect substitute.
RPS policy will boost investments in renewable energy technologies and
displace carbon-intensive fossil fuel technologies. According to one
study, a cap-and trade program or a carbon tax system would be more
effective than the RPS-only policy in reducing GHG emissions.315 As its
percentage requirement becomes more stringent, the RPS is expected to
impact natural gas-fired generation and nuclear power more than coalfired generation. 316 Therefore, a combined policy is advised.
Lastly, international emissions trading offers opportunities to
take advantage of low-cost reduction opportunities available in foreign
countries. Under the Kyoto Protocol, for instance, each Annex B country
may engage in international emissions trading with another Annex B
country and carry out JI or CDM projects in any contracting party to
obtain reduction offsets. If developing countries agree to assume GHG
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol in the future, their
commitments to GHG reductions will further increase an emissions
trading program's potential for cost reductions.
The possible problems with international emissions trading
include paper credits, the deterrence of long-term technological
improvements, and antitrust concerns. One way of counteracting these
problems is to impose a cap on the number of allowances that can be
claimed for GHG reductions in foreign countries. The international
community must also establish a standardized emissions inventory and
monitoring system in order to build trust in the international GHG
allowance trading market and to reduce transaction costs. It should also
promote technology transfers and provide financial assistance to
developing countries for capacity-building.
The EU Directive sets an initial cap on the use of offsets from JI
and the CDM at six percent of total allowable emissions at the EU
313. See WOOLEY, supra note 86, at 17.
314. Id.
315. See Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, Electricity, Renewables, and Climate Change:
Searching for a Cost-Effective Policy 61-62 (Resources for the Future Report 2004), at
http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-RPT-Renewables.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
316. See id. at 29-38.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

level. 317 Offsets from JI and the CDM can also be used to meet a member
nation's GHG emissions reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol,
beginning in 2008.318 Furthermore, the EU Directive provides for a
review of the cap to determine whether it should be raised to eight
319
percent in the next phase.
During Phase I of the Climate Stewardship Act, a covered entity
may meet up to 15 percent of its emissions reduction requirements by
choosing one of the following compliance options: participation in the
international emissions trading market, claim or purchase registered net
increases in sequestration at home and abroad, purchase certified GHG
reductions from non-covered entities, or borrow reduction credits from
320
the EPA.
A covered entity opting-in to the accelerated participation
program can satisfy up to 20-percent of its reduction requirements using
321
these alternative means of compliance, excluding borrowed credits. A
covered entity may be exempt from the reduction requirements for any
amount of certified GHG emissions if "the emission is deposited in a
geological storage facility approved by the EPA Administrator," and if
"the entity agrees to submit tradeable allowances for any portion of the
322
deposited emission that is subsequently emitted from that facility."
The proposed Act does not provide for direct allocation of allowances to
renewable energy sources, cogeneration sources, or waste treatment
facilities.
A covered entity that registers a net increase in carbon sequestration is required to submit relevant information to the EPA every five
years, which is sufficient to allow the Agency to determine the
permanence of that increase based on measurement and verification
methods for sequestration projects under accounting rules to be issued
by the Secretary of Commerce. 323 The Act directs the Secretary of
Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the EPA, to issue
317. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending the Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading within the Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol's project mechanism
[SEC(2003)7851, § 3.1, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!
u
celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=52003PC0403&model=g ichett.
318. See id. § 3.3.
319. See id. § 3.1.
320. Climate Stewardship Act § 312(b).
321. Id. § 335(a)(2). The percentage limit is to be reduced to ten percent during Phase II.
Id. § 312(c).
322. Id. § 311(c).
323. Id. § 371(a).
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sequestration accounting rules for all classes of sequestration projects
and to update the rules "at least once every [five] years." 324
Under the Act, general criteria for sequestration accounting
regulations are as follows:
(1) If the range of possible amounts of net increase in
sequestration for a particular class of sequestration project
is not more than 10 percent of the median of that range, the
amount of sequestration awarded shall be equal to the
median value of that range.
(2) If the range of possible amounts of net increase in
sequestration for a particular class of sequestration project
is more than 10 percent of the median of that range, the
amount of sequestration awarded shall be equal to the fifth
percentile of that range.
(3) The regulations shall include procedures for accounting
for potential leakage from sequestration projects and for
ensuring that any registered increase in sequestration is in
addition to that which would have occurred if this Act had
325
not been enacted.
The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary
of Agriculture, must establish measurement and approval standards for
various types of carbon sequestration practices and technologies,
including soil and forest management and geological storage.326
The Climate Stewardship Act also sets several conditions for the
domestic use of GHG allowances purchased on the international trading
market. In order for a covered entity to use allowances produced in
another nation's trading market, the following conditions must be met:
(A) the Secretary [of Commerce] certifies that the other
nation's system for trading in greenhouse gas emissions is
complete, accurate, and transparent and reviews that
determination at least once every [five] years;
(B) the other nation has adopted enforceable limits on its
greenhouse gas emissions which the tradeable allowances
were issued to implement; and
(C) the covered entity certifies that the tradeable allowance
has been retired unused in the other nation's market.327

324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. § 371(b), (d).
Id. § 371(c).
Id. § 204(a)(2)(D).
Id. § 312(b)(1).
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It is important to note, however, that the United States must
ratify the Kyoto Protocol in order to provide opportunities for domestic
firms to trade allowances in the international emissions trading market;
the current Kyoto regime denies any non-party access to the international emissions trading market or to project-based credit-trading with
328
entities in a contracting party.
4. Emissions Reporting and Allowance Tracking Systems and PublicAccess
The viability of an emissions trading program hinges on its
reduce transaction costs and gain public confidence in the
to
ability
trading market by ensuring transparency and accountability. In addition
to establishing an accurate monitoring system, this goal can be achieved
by maintaining uninhibited information flows that are publicly available
and accessible. Real-time monitoring and access to information and data
on emissions trading and emissions of covered pollutants are essential to
achieving that goal.
For example, under the New Hampshire NOx emission trading
program, the EPA has developed the Emissions and Allowance Tracking
System (EATS). 329 The EATS is an Internet-based automated information
tracking system. "In 2002, 100 percent of emission data and almost 80
330
Each
percent of allowance transfers were submitted electronically."
online
An
number.
serial
a
unique
given
ton of allowance traded is
management system such as EATS "enabl[es] market participants to
331
Regulated firms can regularly
identify potential buyers and sellers."
report emissions and allowance transactions data electronically. The
general public can access all available information and data via the
Internet.
Next generation data systems such as EATS are integrated
database systems performing multi-functions. The current SO 2 and NOx
to
registries "provide data access tools that allow interested persons 332
interest."
most
of
are
that
data
the
of
queries
customized
develop
There are no confidentiality requirements for the data. Systems such as
EATS also perform "automated quality checks on every emission
submission" to ensure that each covered source's total emissions
333
accurately match its allowance holdings. The EPA has recently been
working on developing a more flexible, interoperable system that "can
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

See Bonn Agreements, supra note 19, at 43.
CLEAN AIR MARKETS UPDATE, supra note 175, at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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accept additional pollutants and sectors if [existing trading] programs
are expanded or added in the future" and "reduce data redundancy and
administrative effort and costs," e.g., by integrating emissions and
allowance data reporting.3m
Under the Climate Stewardship Act, the EPA is directed to
construct a GHG emissions database system and to make information in
the system open and "accessible to the public, including in electronic
format on the Internet." 335 With respect to a GHG emissions database
system, the Act provides that
the Administrator shall take into consideration a broad
range of issues involved in establishing an effective
database, including- (A) the appropriate allowances for
reporting each greenhouse gas;
(B) the data and information systems and measures
necessary to identify, track, and verify greenhouse gas
emissions in a manner that will encourage private sector
trading and exchanges;
(C) the greenhouse gas reduction and sequestration
methods and standards applied in other countries, as
applicable or relevant;
(D) the extent to which available fossil fuels, greenhouse
gas emissions, and greenhouse gas production and
importation data are adequate to implement the database;
and
(E) the differences in, and potential uniqueness of, the
facilities, operations, and business and other relevant
practices of persons and entities in the private and public
sectors that may be expected to participate in the
336
database.
The proposed Act requires the EPA to
publish an annual report that (1) describes the total greenhouse gas emissions and
emission reductions reported to the database during the
year covered by the report;
(2) provides entity-by-entity and sector-by-sector
analyses of the emissions and emission reductions
reported;
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 11.
Climate Stewardship Act § 203(c)(6).
Id. § 203(c)(8).
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(3) describes the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases; and
(4) provides a comparison of current and past atmos337
pheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.
Not later than two years after enactment, the EPA must establish
by regulation "a comprehensive system for greenhouse gas emissions
reporting, inventorying, and reductions registration." 338 The Act requires
that the EPA balance two competing policy goals in designing the
system: a new system should ensure "completeness, transparency, and
accuracy" of submitted information while minimizing compliance costs
involved in emissions measurement and reporting.339 Such a system
must verify and track claimed emissions reductions using unique serial
numbers given to account holders. 340 As with the SO 2 Acid Rain
program, the EPA is expected to require covered entities to electronically
submit emissions reports and data about allowance transfers by
integrating a new database system with the EATS to the extent
maximum possible.
The EU Directive also provides for an electronic allowance
tracking and registry system. The European Commission's regulation
contains detailed provisions with regard to the operation and
implementation of this system. The European Commission will operate
an independent allowance "transaction log."341 Each member nation is
required to develop its own national registry of GHG emissions and
allowance transactions. 342 Thus, there will be two concurrent registry
systems within the European Union.
The transaction log operated by the EU Commission will serve
as the temporary communication link between national registries until
the establishment of the communication link 343 and will perform
"automated checks.. .for all processes concerning allowances, verified
emissions, accounts and Kyoto units to ensure that there are no

337. Id. § 203(d).
338. Id. § 201(c)(1).
339. Id. § 201(c)(2)(A).
340. Id. § 201(c)(3).
341. See Commission Regulation (EC) No ... /2004 of xx/xx/2004 for a Standardized
and Secured System of Registries Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Decision 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council, art. 5, xx/xx/2004, at http://umwelt.lebensministerium.at/filemanager/
download/8056/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) (draft) [hereinafter Draft EU Registry
Guidelines].
342. Id. art. 3.
343. See id. art. 6.
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discrepancies." 344 Each national registry must take the form of "a
standardised electronic database." 345 The national registry administrator
is required to correct any inconsistency detected by the transaction log,
and, if the administrator fails to do so, the central administrator charged
with operating the transaction log system must stop all processes within
the system "concerning any of the allowances, accounts or Kyoto units
which are the subject of the earlier inconsistency to proceed." 346 A
member nation or the European Union may join together with other
member nations or the European Union to develop a common registry,
"provided that its registry remains distinct." 347
As required by the Marrakesh Accords, each national registry
must contain one operator holding account, one retirement account, and
cancellation and replacement accounts for each covered source. 3 Each
account is assigned a unique account identification code, the
alphanumeric identifier specified by the account holder, and an account
holder identification code. 349 All transactions between national registries
must be made in accordance with standardized protocols and
procedures. 35° Information exchanged during transactions and
communications should have its own input and response codes that
must be contained in national registries. 351
The Directive provides that each national registry shall contain
one verified emissions table, one surrendered allowances table, and one
compliance status table.35 2 The operator of a covered entity must submit
an annual emissions report to the national registry. Once verified by the
competent national authority, data and information about an entity's
emissions should be entered into the section of the verified emissions
table designated for that entity.3 53 Each national registry and the
transaction log must make emissions and allowance data publicly
available through a website within a time frame specified in the
Directive. 354
However, information disclosure is subject to confidentiality
requirements. In principle, all information relating to allowance
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. art. 28, 1. This requirement applies to each national registry. Id. art. 31.
Id. art. 3, 1.
Id. art. 28, 2.
Id. art. 4.
Id. pmbl., 4; see Marrakesh Accords, supra note 20, pt. 2, vol. II, at 61-62.
Draft EU Registry Guidelines, supranote 341, art. 26.
Id. pmbl., 7.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 24, 1.
Id. art. 51, 1.
Id. art. 9, 7 1-2. See also id. Annex XVI.
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transactions must be kept secret "for any purpose other than the
35 5
The use of
implementation of [the] Regulation.. .or national law."
information requires the prior consent of the account holder "except to
operate and maintain those registries in accordance with the provisions
of [the] Regulation." 356 A government entity cannot compel account
35 7
holders to disclose price information.
In short, the EU's registry system is rather complex to administer
because it aims to coordinate operations of different national registries.
The complexities of the system also partially reflect the fact that it is
designed as part of an international emissions trading program in which
all contracting parties to the Kyoto Protocol will ultimately participate.
5. Penaltiesand Accountability
In addition to rigorous monitoring, reporting, and verification
requirements, stiff penalties should be imposed under a cap-and-trade
program to deter permit violations. A responsible person should be
designated to enhance accountability. Both the Climate Stewardship Act
and the EU Directive contain penalty provisions. For example, under the
Climate Stewardship Act, a violating entity must pay a civil penalty to
the EPA, the amount of which should be "equal to [three times] the
market value (determined as of the last day of the year at issue) of the
tradeable allowances that would be necessary for that covered entity to
meet those requirements on the date of the emission that resulted in the
violation." 358 Beyond this, the Act does not provide for any more
stringent penalties, such as requiring violating sources to surrender
allowances by the amount of excess emissions in the next compliance
period.
The EU Directive requires a violating source to pay a penalty for
excess emissions of 40 Euro per ton of CO 2 in the first phase and 100
Euro per ton of CO 2 in the second phase, respectively, and to surrender
allowances in a number equal to the excess emissions in the following
year. 359 The Directive requires that the names of operators of
noncomplying sources be published. 360 It also provides that authorized
account representatives be designated. Every account holder must
appoint one primary and one secondary authorized representative for

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. art. 10, 1.
Id. art. 10, 2.
Id. art. 9, 5.
Climate Stewardship Act § 372.
EU Emissions Trading Directive, supra note 178, art. 16,
Id. art. 16, 2.

3-4.
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each account. 361 Each member nation and the Commission may permit
362
account holders to nominate one additional authorized representative.
Each verifier must appoint at least one authorized representative for the
363
purpose of verifying emissions data and information.
The EU Directive's penalty provisions are more ideally designed
when compared to those of the Climate Stewardship Act. The Directive
specifically identifies responsible parties within a regulated entity and
provides for stiff penalties that give regulated entities strong incentive to
comply. In contrast, the Climate Stewardship Act does not require
violating sources to surrender allowances. Moreover, the amount of
penalties is not based on a fixed sum, but rather is set in terms of an
allowance's market price prevailing at the end of the compliance period.
Therefore, the Climate Stewardship Act's penalty provisions need to
become more stringent such that industry has enough incentive to
comply.
III. AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE CLIMATE
STEWARDSHIP ACT
The Climate Stewardship Act represents "a significant step
forward" in reducing the nation's GHG emissions. 364 Although it falls
short of pursuing the Kyoto reduction target, the Act's goal of stabilizing
U.S. GHG emissions at 1990 levels is much more aggressive than that of
President Bush's Clear Skies Initiative. 365 Further, the Act adopts a more
comprehensive approach than the EU Emissions Trading Directive. The
EU's Directive targets only 46 percent of EU-wide CO 2 emissions by
covering only CO 2 emissions from four major industrial sectors,
excluding all other GHG emissions from its coverage. 366 In contrast, the
361.
362.
363.

Draft EU Registry Guidelines, supra note 341, art. 23,
Id. art. 23, 2.
Id. art. 23, 3.

1.

364. WILLIAM A. PIZER & RAYMOND J. Kopp, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS OF MCCAIN-LIEBERMAN -"CLIMATE
STEWARDSHIP ACT OF 2003" S. 139,

INTRODUCED 01/09/03, at 1, 4 (2003), http://www.rff.org/rff/Core/Research-Topics/Air/
McCainLieberman/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD4452
[hereinafter RFF ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP ACT].

365. The Clear Skies Initiative is aimed at reducing the nation's carbon intensity.
Carbon intensity is "the ratio of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to economic output";
President Bush's plan aims to reduce carbon intensity by 18 percent in the next ten years.
See Press Release, The White House, Global Climate Change Policy Book (Feb. 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/chimatechange.html.
366. According to one study, the EU emissions trading scheme would not be as costeffective as it would be when it includes all industrial sectors in the program's coverage.
Christoph Bohringer et al., Assessing Emission Allocation in Europe: An Interactive Simulation
Approach, ZEW Discussion Paper 04-40 (2004), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=560881

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

Act will bring most of the nation's CO2 emissions and some emissions of
other GHGs under control.
The Climate Stewardship Act is a bold, laudable, and inspiring
the possibility of its enactment seems very remote in view of
but
move,
the current political resistance to cost-increasing legal measures in the
United States. The Act, first introduced in January 2003 by Senators
McCain and Lieberman and voted on by the full Senate in October
368
2003,367 failed to pass the Senate with a vote of 43 to 55. On March 30,
2004, its House version was reintroduced by Congressmen Wayne
Gilchrest and John Olver, who represented a bipartisan group of
Representatives. 369 The same bill was reintroduced in both chambers of
Congress in early 2005.370
Perhaps the Climate Stewardship Act represents a second-best
solution for the United States in addressing the problem of climate
change. The Act's relatively modest goal of achievement over a ten-year
time period would be more politically acceptable, since its
implementation would probably entail relatively low economic costs.
Only a few analyses of the Act's possible impacts on the U.S. economy
are currently available. They are summarized as follows:
(1) Energy Information Administration (EIA): (i) average
allowance prices: $79 per metric ton of carbon equivalent (about $22 per
metric ton of CO 2 equivalent) in 2010 and $221 per metric ton of carbon
(download from "SSRN Electronic Paper Collection" hyperlinks). This study found that the
aggregate implementation costs of the EU emissions trading program as currently designed
would be "[ten] times higher than under an efficient trading scheme and [six] times higher
than for purely domestic abatement action." Id. at 18. The reason, the authors explained, is
that the EU emissions trading program would shift abatement costs to non-covered sectors
by not including all sectors and by allocating CO2 allowances to covered sectors without
charge. Id. at 18-19. Another study compared changes in EU-wide overall compliance costs
that would be incurred by covered sectors, depending on the availability of JI and CDMrelated credits, i.e., at what percentage is the use of offset credits limited. Note that the EU
Directive limits the use of offsets at six percent during the first implementation period. It
found that an estimated CO 2 allowance price under the unlimited offset scenario would be
as low as twice that expected under the no-offset scenario, saving six billion Euros.
However, the Directive projected that the impact of the current limit on the use of offsets
on compliance costs would be minimal. See KRUGER & PIZER, supra note 194, at 27-29, 44,
tbl. 4 (summarizing the results of a study by P. CRIQUI & A. Krrous, KYOTO PROTOCOL
IMPLEMENTATION: (KPI) TECHNICAL REPORT: IMPACTS OF LINKING JI AND CDM CREDITS TO
THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS ALLOWANCE TRADING SCHEME (2003)).

367. Climate Change Activities, supra note 151, at 5.
368. Id.
369. See Pew Center on Climate Change, Gilchrest-Olver Climate Stewardship Act:
Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Bill Introduced in U.S. House of Representatives, at http://
www.pewcimate.org/_policy.analyses-go.cfm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005).
370. Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, H.R. 759, 109th Cong. § 342 (2005).
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equivalent (about $61 per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent) in 2025; (ii)
average offset prices: $52 per metric ton of carbon equivalent (about
$14.4 per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent); (iii) increases in delivered fossil
fuel prices to covered entities: 31 percent (petroleum products), 79
percent (natural gas), and 485 percent (coal); (iv) increases in consumer
gasoline and electricity prices: 27 percent (gasoline) and 46 percent
(electricity); (v) macroeconomic impact and the income effect: 0.7 percent
loss in real GDP and a $47 decrease in disposable person income; (vi)
expected changes in energy production and consumption patterns:
sharply declined coal use, modest increases in natural-gas-derived
electricity generation, and a big boost in nuclear power and renewable
energy (electricity sector); gradually reduced petroleum use, increased
371
fuel economy, and declined petroleum imports (transportation).
(2) Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): (i) average
allowance prices: $92 per metric ton of carbon equivalent (about $25.5
per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent) in 2010, $117 per metric ton of carbon
equivalent (about $32.5 per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent) in 2015, and
$147 per metric ton of carbon equivalent (about $41 per metric ton of CO 2
equivalent) (without considering the effects of offset credits); $62 per
metric ton of carbon equivalent (about $17 per metric ton of CO 2
equivalent) in 2010, $81 per metric ton of carbon equivalent (about $22.5
per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent) in 2015, and $103 per metric ton of
carbon equivalent (about $28.6 per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent)
3 72
(ii)
(assuming the availability of cost-effective non-CO2 credits);
macroeconomic impact and the income effect: 0.07-0.25% (2010) and
0.11-0.40% (2020) (GDP loss); $50-175 (2010) and $100-350 (2020) (per
household income loss);3 73 (iii) changes in fuel consumption patterns: a
modest increase in natural gas consumption rate versus coal
consumption, and a small reduction in gasoline consumption (compared
374
to the reference case).
371.
U.S. EIA OFF. OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS & FORECASTING, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
ANALYSIS OF S. 139, THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP ACT OF 2003 at 2-4 (2003) [hereinafter EIA
ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP AcT]. Prices and costs were calculated based on

2001 dollars, except that real GDP and disposable personal income were expressed in 1996
dollars. Cost estimates spanned a 25-year time frame.
372. Prices and costs were calculated based on 2001 dollars. The MIT research team
projected average allowance prices under scenarios 5 and 7. In scenario 5, it was assumed
that GHG emissions reduction targets would be phased-in as scheduled, that unlimited
banking would be allowed, and that all GHG emissions would be covered. Effects of
credits and offsets from uncovered sources were not considered. In scenario 9, it was
assumed that cost-effective credits and offsets would be available from domestic sources.
MIT Study, supranote 192, at 17, tbl. 4; Id. at 20, tbl. 5.
373. Id. at 27.
374. Id. at 24, tbl. 7.
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(3) Resources for the Future (RFF): (i) average allowance prices:
$14 per metric ton of CO 2 equivalent (assuming it is constant); (ii)
increases in consumer fossil fuel prices: nine percent (gasoline), 20
percent (natural gas), and 100 percent (coal); (iii) expected loss in real
GDP: 0.01%.375
Of the three analyses, the EIA report is the most rigorous, but it
presents the most pessimistic view of the impacts of the Climate
Stewardship Act, predicting that total U.S. GHG emissions would reach
2000 levels by 2025.376 However, in arriving at its findings, the EIA did
not consider the potential effects of net increases in carbon sequestration
capacity in the United States and allowance and credit purchases in the
international GHG emissions trading market. 3 7 The EIA also assumed
that improvements in energy-saving technologies would have little
impact on overall costs of the Act's implementation. 378 As a result, these
seemingly unrealistic assumptions led to somewhat overestimated cost
figures.
On the other hand, the RFF analysis borrowed many of its
projections from the EPA's estimates. It assumed that "1.3 billion metric
tons of domestic reductions [would be] available at $14 per metric ton of
CO 2 in 2010," and that covered entities "then [would] continue with this
level of annual reductions in the future." 379 The RFF cited the EPA's
estimates by stating, "the cost of these reductions to the U.S. economy
would be around $9 billion annually but, depending on the availability
of international and noncovered domestic reductions, the cost could be
[ten] times higher or lower." 380 The authors implied that the cost
estimates could be lowered further given the possibility of a supply of
relatively cheap foreign allowances and credits and expected
38
technological advances. '
Running its Emissions Projections and Policy Analysis Model
(EPPA)382 with data inputs from available national energy consumption
data and economic indices, the MIT team engaged in a quite reasonable
analysis of the cost impact of a variety of scenarios. Of the modeling
results, it is noteworthy that welfare loss would be minimal. The
explanation provided by the authors was that GHG reduction policy
375.
376.

RFF ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP ACT, supra note 364, at 3-4.
EIA ANALYSIS OF THE CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP AcT, supra note 371, at 2.

377.
378.

See id.
See id. at 4.

379.

380.
381.
382.
Study,

RFF ANALYSIS OF THE CUMATE STEWARDSHIP AcT, supra note 364, at 3.

Id. at 4.
Id.
For a general explanation of the MIT EPPA General Equilibrium Model, see MIT
supranote 192, at 12-14.
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would influence the world oil market, "causing oil prices to fall when oil
consumption is restrained." 383 The MIT team predicted that coal use
would not decline significantly. 384 It was implied in the entire report that
the availability of low-cost options, such as offset purchases from noncovered sources and the market penetration of clean energy
technologies, would result in much less fuel switching in the energy
market than expected.
Assuming that foreign allowances would be available in the
future, the MIT team observed that cheap foreign allowances would
cause average allowance prices to fall significantly, while stating that
expected welfare gains from international trading would not be as great
as usually predicted. 3 The MIT team also modeled the potential effects
386
of improvements in average fuel economy in the transportation sector.
While predicting that improvements in fuel efficiency would further
lower average allowance prices, the team observed that an abundant
supply of offsets from sequestration projects generated by lenient
government policy could "[squeeze] out other credits sources....
dropping to near zero the value of these credits for more efficient
387
vehicles."
CONCLUSION
As a result of Russia's ratification, 3 8 the Kyoto Protocol entered
into force on February 16, 2005.389 However, it is clear that the Protocol
will not be effective in curbing GHG emissions without U.S.
participation. During the first commitment period, negotiations on the
participation of key developing countries are scheduled to take place. It
is expected that developing countries will be given the freedom to
choose a baseline year and a national GHG reduction target, as provided
for in the draft Article 9 of the original negotiating text of the Kyoto
3
Protocol. 90
383. Id. at 18.
384. See id. at 24-25.
385. Id. at 22.
386. For modeling results see id. at 26, tbl. 8.
387. Id. at 26.
388. On November 5, 2004, Russian President Putin ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
Editorial, Kyoto Ratification, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 2004, at A22. Russia's ratification triggered
the 55% ceiling as required by Article 25, Paragraph 1, of the Protocol. Id.
389. Shankar Vedantam, Kyoto Treaty Takes Effect Today, WASH. PoST, Feb. 16, 2005, at
A4.
390. Then-Chairman Raul Estrada of the Seventh Conference of Parties, held in Kyoto,
Japan, in December 1997, came up with the final draft protocol during the negotiation
meetings, which contained a draft Article 9 that would have given developing countries an
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What is missing from the scene is U.S. leadership. The nonparticipation of the United States in the Kyoto Protocol will not only lead
to the Protocol's failure to attain its goals but will also produce resistance
from developing countries to international attempts to impose on them
mandatory GHG emission reduction obligations. The irony is that U.S.
insistence on developing country participation as a precondition for its
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will likely face the same response from
developing countries.
What distinguishes the United States from other advanced
nations in the climate change debate is its tendency to stress short-term
costs rather than long-term benefits. For the most part, this is driven by
the fear that climate policy could turn out to be disastrous for the
nation's economy in view of energy over-consumption patterns at home.
The dominance of an economic way of thinking in U.S. public-policymaking tends to add more fuel to the cost debate over domestic climate
change policy.
As the authors of the studies summarized in the previous section
conceded, an assessment of the long-term economic impact of the
Climate Stewardship Act or any other similar legislation cannot be
accurate given the considerable uncertainty concerning assumptions of
economic growth rates and future legal developments both at home and
abroad. Such an analysis also cannot adequately capture the synergistic
effects that climate change policy would produce within the energy
sector.
A so-called "shallow and deep" approach, 391 advocated by some
mainstream economists, overlooks the fact that delayed GHG reduction
efforts would increase overall long-term compliance costs and could
make sluggish (or even freeze) the pace of improvements and
option to accept legally binding emissions reduction targets and to choose both the baseline
year and the level of emissions reductions to be achieved. However, the draft Article 9 was
deleted from the final text of the Kyoto Protocol due to strong opposition from developing
countries led by China. See Michael R. Molitor, The United Nations Climate Change
Agreements, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS,

LAW, AND POLICY 226-27

(Norman J. Vig & Regina S. Axelrod eds., 1999); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 66, at 630.
391. This approach posits that, given the expected minimal short-term climate
stabilization benefits of implementation of the Protocol's initial GHG reduction targets,
adopting relatively modest reduction goals first and then setting more ambitious goals in
an incremental, flexible manner would provide ample lead time for many nations to build
their capacities to stabilize GHG emissions and to mitigate (or adjust to) global climate
impacts. See, e.g., ROBERT N. STAVINS, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, CAN AN EFFECTEVE
GLOBAL CLIMATE TREATY BE BASED ON SOUND SCIENCE, RATIONAL ECONOMICS, AND

PRAGMATIC POLITICS 8-10 (2004), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-04-28.pdf;
Henry R. Linden, The U.S. Can No Longer Stay on the Sidelines in Formulatinga Rational Global
Climate Change Policy, ELEC. J., Oct. 2001, at 80-44.
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innovations in less carbon intensive, more efficient energy technologies,
which have long suffered from the existing legal system's failure to
embody sustainability concerns. More importantly, such an approach
fails to recognize that addressing global climate change requires
fundamental changes in human behavior, not just technological fixes.
Inducement of a change in behavioral patterns takes time,
because humans often stick to conventional values and old customs even
in times of tumultuous societal change. For over two centuries, humans
have been addicted to fossil-fuel-based energy and the convenience and
pleasure it affords them. Unless accompanied by aggressive efforts to
reduce GHG emissions, any climate change policy may face everstronger political opposition from industry and the general public, who
want to perpetuate their vested interests built into existing socioeconomic structures. This is one of the reasons why inaction or reliance
on voluntary approaches is not a prudent policy path, and why we
should ambitiously pursue the goal of a less carbon-intensive society
despite expected high short-term compliance costs.
Recently, crude oil prices have reached record highs. This should
be an alarming sign to the fossil-fuel-based world economy, indicating
that fossil fuels have already begun to be in short supply. We have a
moral obligation to pass a clean environment and economic prosperity
down to future generations. As stewards of the Earth, we also have the
duty to take care of other species that have suffered from human
intrusions due to excess industrial pollution. Climate change policy
cannot be a one-fits-all solution to curbing increased fossil fuel
combustion, causing greater environmental harm as the developing
world becomes industrialized.
As the analyses of the Climate Stewardship Act show, climate
change policy can be implemented in a cost-effective manner. When
combined with a variety of effective policy tools in other policy areas,
climate change policy would have minimal impacts on the economy
while bringing much greater long-term benefits to society in the form of
reduced pollution and accompanying greater environmental quality and
health benefits, as well as other long-term economic benefits such as
energy security and enhanced international competitiveness.
On January 1, 2005, the European Union began to implement its
emissions trading program. Although all national allocation plans have
not yet been approved by the EU Commission at this time,3 92 the detailed
392. According to EU-provided information, the EU Commission has partially or
conditionally approved the allocation plans of Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Finland, France, and Spain. National allocation plans submitted by other member nations
were fully approved by the Commission prior to the implementation of the EU-wide C02
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scheme of the European Union's emissions trading system will soon
emerge. The European Union's experimentation with a CO 2 emissions
trading system will provide important lessons to the rest of the world
with respect to the future implementation of both U.S. and international
GHG emissions trading programs. As Europeans gain confidence in the
effectiveness of emissions trading in reducing GHG emissions, future
climate change debate will be revolutionized. Hopefully, the resulting
international consensus on prompt climate action will move modem
civilization closer to achieving the ultimate goal of sustainable
development.

emissions trading program. See Press Release, European Union, Questions & Answers on
Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans, Apr. 3, 2004, at http://europa.eu.int/
rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/44&format=HTML&aged=1&langua
ge=EN&guilLanguage=en.

